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Abstract 
No problem generates more debate among constitutional scholars 
than how to approach constitutional interpretation. This Article critiques 
two representative theories (or families of theories), originalism and 
nontextualism, and offers a principled alternative, which we call 
“controlled activism.” By candidly acknowledging the judge’s creative 
role in constitutional lawmaking, controlled activism promises real 
limits on judicial discretion.  
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1486 
 
 I. ORIGINALISM AND THE MISLEADING SEARCH FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL CERTAINTY ............................................ 1493 
  A. Original Intent ............................................................. 1495 
  B. Original Meaning ........................................................ 1498 
  C. Originalist Construction .............................................. 1507 
  D. “Progressive” Originalism .......................................... 1509 
 
 II. NONTEXTUALISM AS A THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC  
VALUES .............................................................................. 1512 
  A. Linguistic Chaos and the Constitution ........................ 1512 
  B. The “Unwritten” Constitution: Alternative 
Rationales .................................................................... 1514 
                                                                                                                     
  Louis & Harriet Ancel Professor of Law & Public Policy, Northwestern University 
School of Law. 
  Associate, Ropes & Gray, Boston, MA; A.B., 2001, Middlebury College; J.D., 2009 
Northwestern University School of Law. 
1
Redish and Arnould: Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democrati
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1486 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
  
   1. Continual Reaffirmation ....................................... 1514 
   2. Implicit Maxims ................................................... 1517 
  C. Expansive Construction of the Ninth Amendment ....... 1520 
 
 III. SEEKING A PRINCIPLED ALTERNATIVE: THE “CONTROLLED  
  ACTIVISM” INTERPRETIVE MODEL ...................................... 1522 
  A. Determining the Outer Reaches of the Constitution’s  
   Words: Modest Exclusionary Textualism .................... 1523 
  B. The Limits of Textualism as a Restraint on  
   Judicial Review ............................................................ 1525 
  C. Constitutional Interpretation in the Absence of  
   Unambiguous Text: Shaping the Contours of the  
   “Controlled Activism” Model ..................................... 1530 
 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1535 
INTRODUCTION 
No controversy has dominated constitutional debate in recent years 
more than that over the origins, legitimacy, and methodology of 
constitutional interpretation. The stakes are high. The future of 
democratic government and the rule of law turn on the outcome. If we 
ultimately conclude that neither the Constitution’s text nor its history 
restrains unrepresentative, unaccountable judges in checking the actions 
of the political branches of either federal or state governments, little will 
be left of our system of popular sovereignty. If, on the other hand, we 
select an interpretive methodology that leaves the political branches 
effectively unchecked, the essential values of counter-majoritarian 
constitutionalism, so central to our political structure, will be seriously 
undermined. Perhaps most alarming are methodologies that permit the 
judicial interpreter to covertly check the political branches when and 
only when the choices of those branches differ from the narrow political 
preferences of the interpreter herself. 
Sadly, every one of these dangers is a realistic possibility. Various 
theories of interpretation advanced by respected scholars and jurists 
give rise to one or more of these harms. In a number of instances, 
scholars have openly advocated adoption of interpretive theories that 
allow the judiciary to sit in judgment on the political wisdom of choices 
made by the representative branches. Other theorists, while not openly 
advocating total judicial abstention in the face of constitutional 
challenges to the actions of the political branches, have urged adoption 
of interpretive models that effectively bring about this result. Numerous 
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approaches to constitutional interpretation have been suggested,
1
 but at 
the risk of oversimplification, it is reasonable to posit predominant the 
existence of two major theoretical camps: originalism
2
 and 
nontextualism.
3
 Each camp includes within its boundaries a number of 
more narrowly defined theories of interpretation, though distinctions 
within these subspecies have often been blurred. To combat these 
dangers, we present a new model of constitutional interpretation—what 
we call “controlled activism”—a framework characterized by 
fundamental adherence to the outer contours of the Constitution’s text 
and use of contemporary semantics to inform textual meaning, uniquely 
combined with a disciplined and candid form of normative judicial 
inquiry. 
The intellectual thread common to most originalists is the belief that 
constitutional interpretation should be characterized exclusively by an 
effort to determine the Constitution’s meaning by means of some form 
of historical inquiry. Included under the originalism umbrella over the 
years, however, have been both advocates of original meaning and 
advocates of an inquiry into Framers’ intent, a now largely defunct 
interpretive paradigm from which original meaning evolved.
4
 Although 
distinct, the two interpretive models are frequently conflated by both 
critics and advocates since evidence advanced to show understanding 
under both often is limited to statements of the Framers themselves.
5
  
Original meaning requires the interpreter to ascertain the public 
understanding of text at the time of a given provision’s adoption. For 
                                                                                                                     
 1. By focusing solely on originalism and nontextualism, we most certainly do not mean 
to imply that no other theories of constitutional interpretation exist. Indeed, some of those 
theories may well be closer to the interpretive model we propose than are either of the two 
theories on which we focus. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) 
(developing theory of the “common law Constitution”). But since the primary goal of this 
Article is to develop our own “controlled activism” interpretive model, we have made the choice 
to point to what we deem the dominant theories of constitutional interpretation in order to 
highlight the need for pursuit of an entirely different approach.  
 2. The label “originalism” appears to have been coined by Professor Paul Brest. See Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980). 
Other discussions have described the same analytical framework as “interpretivism” or 
“intentionalism.” See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 1 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 886 (1985). 
 3. Bizarrely, there are some recent theories that, seemingly contradictorily, attempt to 
combine both. See discussion infra Part III. 
 4. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 
(1999). 
 5. See, e.g., Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 257 (2002) (“The originalist debate has progressed without 
a clear statement of the doctrine or an adequate account of the different versions in which it can 
manifest itself.”); see also, Rebecca Zeitlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement in 
Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (2012). 
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example, if one seeks to interpret the words “privileges and immunities” 
in Article IV under an original meaning analysis,
6
 one must determine 
the meaning of those words as they were commonly understood when 
they were originally promulgated into law. The same inquiry would be 
employed to interpret the words “commerce” in Article I’s Commerce 
Clause,
7
 “due process” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,8 
“freedom of speech” in the First Amendment,9 or any other provision in 
the Constitution’s text. For the most part—though here a fair degree of 
ambiguity appears to exist—this inquiry focuses on generally accepted 
usage, rather than merely the subjective understanding of those 
individuals who framed the words. Historical analysis is used as a 
dispositive measure of these meanings.  
In contrast, advocates of original intent—an interpretive model that 
predates the original meaning approach and has largely fallen out of 
vogue—sought to unearth the subjective intentions of the Framers 
themselves. Original intent, then, was more concerned with an inquiry 
into the holistic, contextual purpose of the Framers—what “Point B” 
they sought to achieve from their starting “Point A.” While inquiry into 
the contemporaneous general understanding of words embodied in the 
Constitution’s text might well be relevant to this inquiry, it is not 
necessarily dispositive. Indeed, in extreme instances of original intent 
analysis, the Framers’ intent has even overcome an absence of textual 
support entirely.
10
 The inquiry is, instead, focused exclusively on an 
effort to ascertain the subjective intent of those involved in the drafting 
and ratification of a relevant constitutional provision, as determined by 
available documentary evidence.
11
 Popular adherence to one or the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2. 
 7. Id. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 8. Id. amend. V, XIV. 
 9. Id. amend. I. 
 10. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999) (holding that in the interest of 
state sovereignty, the Constitution provides Eleventh Amendment immunity for nonconsenting 
states from suits filed by citizens of that state or any foreign state despite the fact that sovereign 
immunity does not derive from the Eleventh Amendment). Cf. MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-
MAKING PROCESS 166 (6th ed. 2004) (“It is for the courts to construe [a statute’s] words and it is 
the court’s duty in so doing to give effect to the intention of Parliament in using those words.”); 
EDWARD BEAL, CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 257 (2d ed. 1908) (quoting West 
Ham Churchwardens and Overseers v. Iles, [1883] 8 App. Cas. 386 (H.L.) 388–89 (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (Lord Blackburn)) (“[I]n construing an Act of Parliament where the intention of the 
legislature is declared by the preamble, we are to give effect to that preamble to this extent, 
namely, that it shows us what the legislature are intending; and if the words of enactment have a 
meaning which does not go beyond that preamble, or which may come up to the preamble, in 
either case we prefer that meaning to one showing an intention of the legislature which would 
not answer the purposes of the preamble, or which would go beyond them. To that extent only is 
the preamble material.”). 
 11. Exactly what is or is not to be included in this evidentiary category has been the 
subject of debate. See discussion infra Part I. 
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other form of originalism, the approach’s advocates believe, will 
restrain activist judges from replacing the social policy choices of the 
political branches with their own. 
Traditionally, originalism has been associated with constitutional 
scholars and jurists aligned with some category of the political right.
12
 
More recently, however, so-called progressive constitutional theorists 
have sought to capture the superficial legitimacy thought to come from 
professed adherence to original meaning by developing their own form 
of originalism known as progressive originalism.
13
 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the progressive form of the interpretive model leads its 
proponents to doctrinal conclusions that are far more consistent with the 
political views of the left than those reached by politically conservative 
originalists.
14
 Complicating the entire originalist inquiry is the more 
recent development by certain leading originalists of the so-called 
“interpretation–construction” dichotomy. In certain instances, their 
scholars concede, it is impossible to resolve modern constitutional 
controversies on the “interpretation” of the text’s original meaning. In 
such instances, they believe, the Court should instead employ a process 
of constitutional “construction,” whereby it seeks to ascertain the 
underlying purpose of the relevant constitutional provision and then 
extrapolate it to apply it to the modern situation. 
While the underlying epistemological foundations of these 
approaches may differ in terms of application and desired policy 
outcomes, they share the similarity that, behind an often contrived and 
opaque veil of historical inquiry, originalist jurists are effectively 
empowered to engage in exactly the type of ideologically driven, 
outcome-determinative analysis that originalism claims to be designed 
to prevent. Judicial application of the model has, on a number of 
occasions,
15
 exposed the paradigm’s irreconcilable archeological and 
conceptual shortcomings, and, in so doing, has negated originalism’s 
self-proclaimed status as a relevant, principled interpretive 
methodology. 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 12–13 (1990); STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 
1 (2007); Barnett, supra note 4, at 612; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 849, 852 (1989). 
 13. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 
293 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Framework 
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 552 (2009) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution]; Jack M. Balkin, Original 
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption]; Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original 
Intent, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at A3; Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, How Liberals 
Can Take Back the Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2007. 
 14. See discussion infra Section I.D. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I. 
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At the opposite end of the interpretive spectrum are those 
constitutional scholars and jurists who either believe in some form of 
linguistic deconstruction
16
 or adhere to the notion that there are unstated 
constitutional directives that exist alongside the explicit text of the 
Constitution.
17
 Together, these approaches make up what we broadly 
describe as the nontextualism school of constitutional interpretation. 
The former group of scholars, drawing upon the well-established 
counterpart to its interpretive theory in literary analysis,
18
 asserts that 
words are inherently ambiguous and capable of infinite meanings, and 
thus naturally impose no practical restraint on interpreting courts.
19
 In 
contrast, advocates of the unwritten Constitution model focus on the 
need for abandonment of the dead hand of the past and reaffirmation of 
the Constitution by each generation. This approach, in essence, permits 
nontextually grounded revision of the Constitution in order to satisfy the 
needs of contemporary society—however those needs are determined.20 
Although nontextualism is most commonly associated with scholars and 
jurists who adhere to some form of political liberalism, the model has 
also attracted political conservatives, who on occasion find its use 
appropriate to attainment of their own ideological objectives.
21
  
                                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Nihilism, in “Of Law and the River,” and of Nihilism 
and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 (1985) (“[Critical Legal Studies] people do 
frequently say that law, or legal rights, are ‘indeterminate.’”); Sanford Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 374 (1982).  
 17. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); Michael J. Perry, 
Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due 
Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 691 (1976) (arguing in favor of an “organic” Constitution); see 
also Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 
(1975) (arguing in favor of “acceptance of the courts’ additional role as the expounder of basic 
national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment even when the content of these ideals is 
not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution”). Professor Grey continues: 
The intellectual framework against which these rights have developed is 
different from the natural-rights tradition of the founding fathers—its rhetorical 
reference points are Anglo-American tradition and basic American ideals, 
rather than human nature, the social contract, or the rights of man. But it is the 
modern offspring, in a direct and traceable line of legitimate descent, of the 
natural-rights tradition that is so deeply embedded in our constitutional origins. 
Id. at 717. 
 18. For a compelling survey of the law and literature school, see Richard A. Posner, Law 
and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); see also Symposium: Law 
and Literature, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739, 739–936 (1988). 
 19. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 20. See Brest, supra note 2, at 225–26 (arguing that “[g]iven the questionable authority of 
the American Constitution . . . it is only through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence 
that the document could become law.”). 
 21. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (reading conservative economic 
principles into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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While the underlying theoretical rationales of these nontextualist 
approaches differ at the margins, they share a common bond: all 
effectively permit the interpreter to check the political branches totally 
freed from the strictures of the Constitution’s text, no matter how 
seemingly unambiguous that text happens to be. The assertion that the 
Constitution is made up not only of notions of natural law, but also of 
historical lessons drawn from generations of thoughts about the 
Constitution itself,
22
 underscores nontextualism’s susceptibility to 
strategic manipulation. On its face, nontextualism permits selective 
manipulation of constitutional doctrine in order to advance narrow 
political goals. Its inexplicable rejection of Article V’s formal 
amendment process and expansive reading of the Ninth Amendment 
expose the nation’s foundations of law and liberty to boundless 
interpretation by anyone who professes the ability to discern directives 
supposedly implicit within the Constitution’s interstices. The ominous 
threats that these interpretive models pose to democratic government 
cannot be overstated. Surely the Americans who fought a revolutionary 
war for independence from dictatorial rule would never have vested in 
nine unrepresentative, unaccountable judges the power to impose 
unguided, textually ungrounded limits on democratically authorized 
choices. 
In short, neither originalism nor nontextualism offers a principled 
method of constitutional interpretation, consistent with the contours of 
the nation’s version of constitutional democracy. Inasmuch as 
preservation of both the adjective and the noun in that phrase is critical 
to our system of government and justice, both paradigms suffer from 
countless theoretical and normative problems which ultimately render 
both models untenable. Originalism inherently suffers from fatal 
conceptual and archeological difficulties. When employed in a 
deferential manner, originalism ignores the adjective (“constitutional”) 
in favor of the noun (“democracy”) as a means of rejecting what its 
advocates perceive as the inherent and unacceptably antidemocratic 
nature of the very process of judicial review.
23
 This, of course, 
undermines the fundamental structure of our counter-majoritarian 
system, which necessarily attempts to curtail subversion of the will of 
elected majorities by unelected minorities via judicial review of the 
actions of the political branches.
24
 At the same time, originalism on 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 211 (“In the end, it is the struggle itself—not any of the 
interim destinations to which it might lead—that the constitutional quest is all about.”). 
 23. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893) (arguing that courts must not reject statutes 
as unconstitutional unless they unquestionably violate the Constitution and that judicial review 
is undemocratic since it undercuts popular responsibility). 
 24. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (1959). 
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occasion also—paradoxically—has been employed to ignore the noun 
(“democracy”) in favor of the adjective (“constitutional”). It does so 
when it employs pseudo-historical analysis as a means of imposing 
limitations on government above and beyond those placed on 
government by the document’s unambiguous text.25 Nontextualists, on 
the other hand, allow abandonment of the Constitution’s text in favor of 
the interpreter’s own notions of foundational value choices, thereby also 
ignoring the noun in the phrase “constitutional democracy.” 
Despite their differences, both interpretive schools are identical in 
their enormous susceptibility to abuse by those who seek to overlay 
their own sociopolitical views on the Constitution. Just as the 
“Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics,” to borrow from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous 
dissent in Lochner v. New York,
26
 it also does not enact countless other 
interpretations of our Constitution based purely on the interpreter’s 
personal political, social, or economic beliefs. Despite such alarming 
evidence of each model’s failures, these schools of interpretation 
continue to be championed by prominent members of both the academy 
and the judiciary.  
Our inquiry begins with the assumption that surely some acceptable 
alternative lies between the extremes of the often fruitless and 
strategically manipulative straightjacket of originalism’s supposedly 
rigid historical inquiry on the one hand, and the linguistic chaos and 
epistemological arrogance of nontextualist inquiry on the other. In this 
Article, we seek to develop such an alternative model—what we call 
“controlled activism.” The controlled activist framework that we 
fashion operates, at its most basic level, as a modest form of 
exclusionary textualism. Where the Constitution is unambiguous, 
interpreters look to the plain meaning of its text, as defined by 
contemporary understandings. Moreover, even in those instances in 
which textualist analysis fails to reveal a single, unchangeable meaning, 
it may nevertheless suggest an exclusionary form of plain meaning. In 
other words, while it may not be clear on the four corners of a provision 
what the words mean, it will be clear what the words do not mean. Our 
model thus summarily excludes a number of suggested constructions of 
the constitutional directive in question. Within this textual envelope, the 
controlled activist model openly recognizes the appropriateness of 
normative interpretation as an essential element of judicial review, 
restrained by the outer linguistic limits of the four corners of the 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See discussion infra notes 67–86 and accompanying text (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the individual right to bear arms). 
 26. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Constitution’s text. It also offers a salient set of guidelines by which 
principled normative inquiry may proceed.
27
  
Unlike classic originalists, we reject the straightjacket of history as 
the only permissible means by which interpreters may arrive at the 
meaning of the Constitution’s text. In a certain sense, we suppose, our 
approach is comparable to the recently developed “originalist 
construction” model, albeit absent the purported partial restraint 
imposed by historical inquiry. On the other hand, unlike nontextualists, 
we demand that interpretation be confined to the outer linguistic reaches 
of applicable constitutional text. Unlike both preexisting models, to the 
extent that the Constitution’s text presents ambiguity, our controlled 
activist model advocates use of principled normative inquiry, informed 
and controlled by a transparent, candid explication of a constitutional 
provision’s underlying meaning based on the intellectual normative 
framework chosen to be employed by the jurist. Controlled activism, 
then, endeavors to avoid the most significant practical shortcoming of 
the originalist and nontextualist paradigms—strategic, outcome-
determinative manipulation. Our proposed model offers the only viable 
interpretive alternative to these extremes: it effectively prohibits all 
forms of nontextualist analysis that reject text completely, as well as all 
forms of originalism that relegate textual analysis purely and rigidly to 
the opaque trenches of historical inquiry. 
We begin our efforts with the comfortable awareness that whatever 
flaws may plague our proposed model, the result will most assuredly be 
no worse than what has been employed to this point by leading 
constitutional theorists. While some critics may balk at our open 
acceptance of normative judicial inquiry, it is important to note that in 
many areas of constitutional law the Court already adheres to the 
framework we espouse, albeit without the candor or control imposed by 
formally expressed acceptance of our proposed paradigm.
28
 The next 
two sections of this Article dissect originalism and nontextualism in 
order to demonstrate the fatal flaws in both. In the final section, we seek 
to develop the contours of the “controlled activism” model of 
constitutional interpretation as an alternate to the fatally flawed 
prevailing interpretive models.  
I.  ORIGINALISM AND THE MISLEADING SEARCH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
CERTAINTY 
Over the past three decades, the epistemological merits and pitfalls 
of the originalist school of constitutional interpretation have been 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See discussion infra Part III. 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. 
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rigorously debated.
29
 The issue first came into public view during 
Attorney General Edwin Meese’s 1985 speech to the American Bar 
Association in which he called, broadly, for a “Jurisprudence of 
Original Intention.”30 Originalism has subsequently come to embody a 
wide range of interpretive philosophies, including the original intent, 
original meaning, originalist construction, and progressive originalism 
schools. Indeed, the irony of the originalist school of interpretation is 
that an interpretive paradigm supposedly so committed to the 
unchanging goals of the Constitution has itself been subjected to more 
stylistic changes than spring fashion design. Nevertheless, at the core of 
originalist thinking lies a fundamental desire to ground constitutional 
interpretation in historical inquiry in an effort to preserve the 
democratic system,
31
 promote judicial restraint and consistency of 
precedent,
32
 and produce “good” results.33  
Contemporary originalists posit that original understanding is the 
only mode of interpretation that meets the criteria that any theory of 
constitutional adjudication must satisfy in order to possess democratic 
legitimacy. According to most versions of originalism,
34
 the 
Constitution may be changed only through resort to the formal 
amendment process set out in Article V. Proponents of originalism 
claim that the paradigm is superior to nontextualism
35
 because it relies 
on a criterion—the meaning of the words exclusively as understood at 
the time of their ratification—entirely distinct from a judge’s individual 
preferences. Originalism supposedly avoids the pitfall of asking 
judges—fallible humans, subject to prejudices and ideological 
preconceptions—to differentiate between unwritten values that are 
fundamental to our society and political values that they personally 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See BORK, supra note 12, at 12; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1998) (explaining Justice Antonin Scalia’s views on orginalist 
construction of legal texts); CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 63–65 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A 
Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085 (1989) (providing an overview of how original 
intent developed). 
 30. CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 1; Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Address before 
the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR 
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9 (1986); see also Edwin Meese III, A Return to Constitutional 
Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 925–33 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 12–13; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988); Scalia, supra note 12, at 861. 
 32. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12; Scalia, supra note 12, at 855; William Michael 
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 882 (1995). 
 33. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383–84 (2007). 
 34. See discussion infra Section I.C. (discussing theory of originalist construction). 
 35. See discussion infra Part III.  
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endorse. Since originalism is said to be animated by the belief that “the 
rule of law requires judges to follow externally imposed rules,”36 strict 
adherence to dispositive historical inquiry is said to promote a systemic 
philosophical separation of personal and legal convictions.
37
 
Notwithstanding its purported goal of promoting neutrality, 
restrained judicial decision making, and adherence to the Constitution’s 
text, the originalist model inevitably lends itself to precisely the type of 
strategic political manipulation that it claims to avoid. Indeed, the very 
construct on which subdivisions of originalism agree—namely that 
analysis of history authoritatively settles textual meaning—is doomed 
by conceptual, archeological, and transparency problems, which render 
it as susceptible to manipulation of constitutional directives as do 
nontextual inquiries into the Constitution’s supposedly implicit 
maxims.
38
 In the final analysis, then, originalism suffers from all of the 
interpretive pathologies that it purports to cure: manipulation of 
superficially neutral and coherent interpretive criteria that often are 
inaccessible to nonmembers of the legal profession, much less to lay 
citizens, as a means of achieving politically or ideologically driven 
goals. In the following discussions, we examine each of the suggested 
subcategories of originalist analysis. 
A.  Original Intent 
The original intent version of originalism,
39
 which seeks to interpret 
the Constitution by reference to the subjective intentions of the Framers, 
suffers from myriad pragmatic and conceptual flaws. For one thing, it 
fails to answer whether the Framers even had a single intent, and, if they 
did, whether they themselves intended for that collective intent to be 
utilized as the sole guide in interpreting their words.
40
 On the most basic 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Treanor, supra note 32, at 856. 
 37. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 385–86 (“[T]he strict 
supermajoritarian rules that govern the Constitution’s enactment make it socially desirable. . . . 
The supermajority rules of the Constitution’s enactment . . . make them good enough to enforce 
when they conflict with mere majoritarian enactments.”). 
 38. See discussion infra Part II. 
 39. This school of interpretation is also known as “intentionalism.” See Powell, supra note 
2, at 886. For descriptions of original intent, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 
363, 365–66 (1977) (concluding that “[c]urrent indifference to the ‘original intention’ . . . is a 
relatively recent phenomenon” so the intention of the framers should control interpretation, 
because it is only by examining their ‘original intent’ that the interpreter can determine the 
Constitution’s normative meaning); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1971); Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. 
L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that historically demonstrable intentions of the framers should 
be binding on modern interpreters of the Constitution). 
 40. See, e.g., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 62 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Brest, supra note 2, at 212–22; Powell, supra note 2, at 948 
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level, it is unclear even who originalists mean when they refer to “the 
Framers.” What James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay 
wrote in the Federalist Papers,
41
 for example, while undoubtedly of 
great interpretive significance,
42
 does not necessarily reflect the views 
of all of those involved in the drafting of the Constitution. Moreover, 
their statements most certainly cannot be presumed to reflect the 
understanding of each of the state ratifying conventions, since the 
Federalist Papers were written for the purpose of directly influencing 
only the New York Convention.
43
 Similarly, while the writings of John 
Adams and Thomas Jefferson are considered evidence of the original 
intent of the Framers, neither man even attended the Philadelphia 
Convention.
44
 Therefore, whether they even qualify as “Framers” for 
the purposes of an inquiry into Framers’ intent is subject to debate.  
The fundamental problem with any effort to discern Framers’ intent 
is the impossibility of gleaning a single, coherent collective intention. 
Any assumption that all those involved in the drafting and ratification 
processes shared some single vision is either hopelessly naïve or 
shamefully disingenuous. Moreover, even were we able to suspend 
disbelief on this insurmountable interpretive difficulty, any attempt to 
ascertain Framers’ intent suffers from a significant archeological defect: 
The simple reality is that there generally exists insufficient data upon 
which to determine intent with any reasonable certainty.
45
 On occasion 
this problem has led even the most ardent originalists to concede the 
relative futility of historical inquiry in resolving a number of important 
contemporary issues of constitutional interpretation,
46
 and has led to 
                                                                                                                     
(arguing that originalist reliance on the “intent” of the Framers can gain no support from the 
assertion that such was the Framer’s expectation, since the Framers themselves did not believe 
such an interpretive strategy to be appropriate). 
 41. THE FEDERALIST (1788). 
 42. As of 2000, The Federalist had been quoted at least 291 times in Supreme Court 
decisions. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 260 (2004). 
 43. It has been pointed out, for example, that Alexander Hamilton, who wrote the majority 
of the essays in The Federalist Papers, was absent for parts of the Philadelphia Convention. 
John Jay did not attend at all, nor did John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, or John Henry. See 
JOSEPH A. MURRAY, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN FOUNDER 89–110 (2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Brest, supra note 2, at 221 (“The act of translation required . . . involves the 
counterfactual and imaginary act of projecting the adopters’ concepts and attitudes into a future 
they probably could not have envisioned. When the interpreter engages in this sort of projection, 
she is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters’ making.”). 
 46. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that in the absence of dispositive historical evidence, “I must resolve this 
case in accord with our existing jurisprudence”). Justice Scalia admits that since some features 
of early American society are no longer acceptable to modern sensibilities, originalism, “[i]n its 
undiluted form, at least . . . is medicine that seems too strong to swallow,” and therefore, “in a 
crunch [he] may prove to be a faint-hearted originalist.” Scalia, supra note 12, at 861, 864. 
Accordingly, he considers it permissible to depart from a historical rule when an “evolution in 
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creation of far more flexible versions of originalism.
47
 The proposal 
made by one respected advocate of originalism to deal with this 
archaeological problem—where the history of a constitutional provision 
is indeterminate, the answer is for the courts simply to decline to 
enforce the relevant provision
48—ironically achieves the one result that 
common sense dictates the Framers did not intend: the total 
ineffectiveness of the provision.  
As troubling as the archaeological difficulty is, in numerous 
contexts the problems with the original intent interpretive model go far 
deeper than that. In many situations, evidence of intent is unavailable 
simply because the interpretive problem in question occurred to no one 
at the time of the framing, either because it was unrecognized or 
because it was physically or politically unforeseeable.
49
 In the absence 
                                                                                                                     
social attitudes has occurred.” Id. at 864. Without citing specific evidence, Justice Scalia has 
argued, for example, that he would be unlikely to sustain a legislative enactment of public 
flogging, since social mores has evolved beyond the practice. Id. He also is willing to 
“adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .” Id. at 861. Accepting the notion 
that stare decisis lies outside the boundaries of originalist analysis, this concession stands in 
stark contrast to Justice Scalia’s traditionally unflagging outward commitment to dispositive 
historical inquiries. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and his Critics: An Exploration of 
Scalia’s Fidelity to his Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1411–13 (1999); 
Steven Presser, Touting Thomas, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2005) (“For [originalists], and for 
Clarence Thomas, it’s more important to get it right than to maintain continuity.”). For further 
discussion of “faint-hearted originalism,” see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
43 (2002) (“Taken as a whole, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential thought is both engaging and 
disturbing. It is engaging because of his candid admission of the gap between his originalist 
rhetoric and the realities of law. As much as he emphasizes the importance of rules, he realizes 
that they cannot always govern; as much as he emphasizes originalism, he recognizes that 
theoretical positions about originalism are usually remote from the disputes in actual cases.”). 
Contra ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 47 (1998) (“By trying to make the 
Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to age, we shall have caused it to do 
nothing at all.”). 
 47. See discussion infra Sections I.B–D. 
 48. See BORK, supra note 12, at 166 (“The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a 
provision is in exactly the same circumstance as a judge who has no Constitution to work with. 
There being nothing to work with, the judge should refrain from working. A provision whose 
meaning cannot be ascertained [from history] is precisely like a provision that is written in 
Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink 
blot . . . .”). 
 49. Prior to Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), for example, the Court 
had stated that a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial was determinable via historical analysis 
of common law practice prior to the year of the amendment’s promulgation, 1791. See Dimick 
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1935). Since a right to jury trial historically extended to suits at 
law, but not in equity, the applicability of the Seventh Amendment was generally determined by 
way of historical analysis—would the case have been deemed “law” or “equity” in 1791. Id. In 
Beacon Theaters, however, the Court held that where legal and equitable claims are joined in 
the same action, the legal claims must be tried by a jury before the equitable claims can be 
resolved. Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at 506–07. As such, the Court preserved the dynamic 
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of dispositive historical evidence, the result, not surprisingly, is that 
resort to original intent has a tendency to devolve into little more than a 
strategic means to buttress efforts to attain a desired political end. 
Because of its numerous defects, original intent has largely been 
abandoned both by those who have always opposed it and by many who 
had originally championed it. The discussion that follows therefore 
focuses on the revised version of originalism that replaced it. 
B.  Original Meaning 
The original meaning school,
50
 which grew out of an attempt to 
avoid the vagaries of historical subjectivism and the resulting 
indeterminacy that plagued the original intent model, nevertheless 
manages not only to suffer from many of the same archaeological 
pitfalls and dangers of strategic selectivity as does original intent, but 
also to add additional conceptual and practical shortcomings. 
Admirably, advocates of the original meaning school recognize the 
futility of attempting to ascertain the subjective goals of a group of 
individual authors.
51
 They also wisely recognize that to the extent that 
Framers’ intent in adopting particular constitutional text differs 
significantly from widespread popular understanding of the meaning of 
the controlling text’s words at the time of their adoption, it is that shared 
understanding, rather than the secret subjective understanding of the 
                                                                                                                     
concept implicated by the Seventh Amendment’s language, “the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved,” but did not confine its analysis to what existed in 1791. Because it never would have 
occurred to the drafters that reproducing divisions between law and equity would be so 
challenging in 1959, the Court was, as a practical matter, compelled to deviate from the 
Framers’ intent while still preserving the directive embodied in the Seventh Amendment. See, 
e.g., Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of 
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 496 (1975). 
 50. This interpretive model is also known as “Original Public Meaning Originalism” or 
“New Originalism.” See Barnett, supra note 4, at 620; Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 
2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 607 (2004); see also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 859, 875 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the 
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. 
REV. 803, 817–32 (1994). 
 51. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 144 (“If someone found a letter from George 
Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by the power to lay taxes was not what 
other people meant, that would not change our reading of the Constitution in the slightest. . . . 
Law is a public act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how 
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time.”); see also Antonin 
Scalia, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Address at Catholic University of 
America (Oct. 14, 1996) (“You will never hear me refer to original intent, because as I say I am 
first of all a textualist, and secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, you don’t care about 
the intent, and I don’t care if the Framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind 
when they adopted its words. I take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the 
United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words.”). 
14
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Framers, that must control.
52
 Otherwise, government could easily 
establish a framework of deception by implementing its policy choices 
without making the electorate aware of those choices—a practice hardly 
consistent with the foundational notion of rule by consent of the 
governed.
53
 What matters to proponents of the original meaning model, 
therefore, is the public understanding of the Constitution’s maxims at 
the time of ratification, rather than the Framers’ private understandings 
of those terms.
54
 As a practical matter, however, it has often turned out 
to be strikingly similar to an original intent inquiry, because the best 
evidence of public meaning at the time of drafting and ratification is 
often statements of those involved in the drafting and ratification 
processes.
55
 To the extent the original meaning inquiry departs from 
total reliance on such statements, it runs into other serious problems.  
Original meaning possesses neither a clear methodology for 
deciding which historical materials may be used to determine meaning 
nor rules for analysis once an appropriate historiography has been 
gathered.
56
 Indeed, according to one professional historian, originalism 
                                                                                                                     
 52. BORK, supra note 12, at 144 (“Though I have written of the understanding of the 
ratifiers of the Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, that is actually a shorthand 
formulation, because what the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be 
what the public of that time would have understood the words to mean . . . . The search is not for 
a subjective intention.”). 
 53. Some originalists also contend that the Framers themselves intended the meaning of 
their words to be what the public of that time would have understood their words to mean. See, 
e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 144 (“[T]he common objection to the philosophy of original 
understanding—that Madison kept his notes of the convention at Philadelphia secret for many 
years—is off the mark. He knew that what mattered was public understanding, not subjective 
intentions. Madison himself said that what mattered was the intention of the ratifying 
conventions.”). 
 54. Id.; see Barnett, supra note 4, at 620; Monaghan, supra note 31, at 725–26 (“The 
relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language when the Constitution 
was developed. Hamilton put it well: ‘whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a 
constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to 
the usual and established rules of construction.’”) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 8 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1965)); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The 
Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13; see also OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 204 (1920) (arguing that the relevant issue when 
interpreting law is “not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of 
a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances they were used”). 
 55. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 56. The relevance of post-ratification evidence as to pre-ratification intent, for example, is 
a question that has resulted in some controversy. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1165 (1992) (arguing that, from a historical perspective, the President must have the 
authority to control all government officials who implement the laws), with Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (“We 
think that the view that the framers constitutionalized anything like this vision of the executive 
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“is not a neutral interpretive methodology, but little more than a 
lawyer’s version of a magician’s parlor trick—admittedly clever, but 
without any intellectual heft.”57 The same scholar criticizes originalists’ 
historical analysis for failing to meet the rigors of professional historical 
scholarship,
58
 and accuses originalists of “cherry pick[ing] quotes and 
present[ing] this amateurish research as systematic historical inquiry.”59 
Merely by conclusively declaring a historical source to be “influential,” 
originalist jurists are able to rely on it.
60
 Thus, this interpretive model, 
championed as a means of improving consistency and judicial 
neutrality, is susceptible to both unpredictability and manipulated, 
result-oriented analysis. The disparate conclusions regarding the 
meaning of the commerce power
61
 advanced by, for example, Professor 
Akhil Amar
62
 and Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurring opinion in 
United States v. Lopez
63
 offer a straightforward illustration of this 
problem. In both instances, history was utilized to illuminate the 
original meaning of constitutional text. Justice Thomas surveyed 
historical usage of the term “commerce” at the time of the Philadelphia 
Convention and concluded that it encompassed only selling, buying, 
bartering, and transporting.
64
 Professor Amar, in contrast, conducted an 
analysis which purported to employ an identical methodology, but 
arrived at a much broader view of the original meaning of “commerce” 
as embracing “all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life,” whether 
economic or otherwise.
65
 Emblematic of originalism’s susceptibility to 
                                                                                                                     
is just plain myth. It is a creation of the twentieth century, not the eighteenth. It derives from 
twentieth century categories applied unreflectively to an eighteenth century document.”). See 
also Bravin, supra note 13 (“By applying methods blessed by conservatives to the neglected 
texts and forgotten framers of the Reconstruction amendments, liberals hope to deploy powerful 
new arguments to cement precedents under threat from the right and undergird the recognition 
of new rights. That upends Justice Scalia’s technique, which focuses on the initial 18th-century 
constitutional text to find narrow individual rights and limited federal power to protect them.”). 
 57. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008).  
 58. Id. at 627 (referring to use of “impressionistic scholarly methodology that is thirty 
years out of date”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 629–30. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 62. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005). 
 63. 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 64. Id. at 585; see also Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 849 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning 
of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 (2001). 
 65. Congress’s power to act would hinge, in other words, not on the question of whether 
an activity had a potential economic effect but whether “a given problem genuinely spilled 
across state or national lines.” AMAR, supra note 62 (arguing that “commerce . . . had in 1787, 
and retains even now, a broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of 
life”); see also Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
16
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strategic manipulation is the fact that both analyses relied on the same 
historical source—the Oxford English Dictionary—as evidence 
supporting their conclusions.
66
  
The failure of competing originalist analyses to agree on a single 
meaning evinces a basic failure of the model to succeed in its most 
fundamental pursuit: avoidance of uncertainty and ideologically driven 
outcome determination.
67
 While reasonable people may, of course, 
                                                                                                                     
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1999). 
 66. Compare AMAR, supra note 62, at 107 n.16 (citing “OED entry on ‘commerce’”), with 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86 (1995) (“At the time the original Constitution was ratified, 
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these 
purposes. This understanding finds support in the etymology of the word, which literally means 
‘with merchandise.’” (citations omitted)) (citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 
1989)). 
 67. The majority and dissent’s competing uses of the diaries of St. George Tucker in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), gleaning an individual right to bear arms 
from an inquiry into two original meanings of the Second Amendment’s words, offer another 
example of this difficulty. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, TEN NOTEBOOKS OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
LAW LECTURES 126–29 (unpublished Tucker–Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem 
Library at The College of William and Mary) (copies on file with the Northwestern University 
Law Review). Compare Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second 
Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
406, 406–07 (2009), with David T. Hardy, The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker: A Framing 
Era View of the Bill of Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 272, 278 (2008). The majority 
invoked Tucker’s writings to derive an individual-rights meaning from the text of the Second 
Amendment, arguing, in effect, that Tucker believed the Second Amendment enshrined a 
private right of individual self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95 (“[Tucker] understood the 
right to enable individuals to defend themselves . . . . Americans understood the ‘right of self-
preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his 
behalf may be too late to prevent an injury.”) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 145–
46, n.42 (1803)); Heller, 554 U.S. at 606 (“St. George Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries . . . conceived of the Blackstonian arms right as necessary for self-defense. He 
equated that right . . . with the Second Amendment.”). For preceding commentaries, see Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 461 (1995) 
and David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1359, 1368–70. In so doing, the majority dismissed, without further analysis, the ambiguities 
inherent in Tucker’s viewpoint.  
Justice Stevens quotes some of Tucker’s unpublished notes, which he claims 
show that Tucker had ambiguous views about the Second Amendment . . . . But 
it is clear from the notes that Tucker located the power of States to arm their 
militias in the Tenth Amendment, and that he cited the Second Amendment for 
the proposition that such armament could not run afoul of any power of the 
federal government . . . . Nothing in the passage implies that the Second 
Amendment pertains only to the carrying of arms in the organized militia. 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 606 n.19. Writing for the dissent, however, Justice John Paul Stevens 
marshaled competing commentary on the Second Amendment that was also written by Tucker 
to demonstrate that Tucker’s views were, in fact, unclear. Id. at 666 n.32 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). In contrast to the majority’s conclusion, Justice Stevens argued that Tucker “did not 
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disagree over interpretive matters, when reasonable people disagree 
over the fundamental original meaning of text based on identical 
historical source materials, the value of originalism as a means of 
authoritatively determining constitutional meaning becomes highly 
questionable.
68
 The key point to recognize is that the entire goal of 
originalism is to find a conclusion on which reasonable people cannot 
differ. Once that goal is abandoned, the theory causes far more harm 
than good, for it puts a misleading veneer of certitude and neutrality on 
an interpretive enterprise that is anything but. 
As if there were not already enough problems, two additional 
difficulties plague the inquiry into original meaning. Initially, there 
exists an overwhelming archaeological problem due to the simple lack 
of relevant data. The individual words in question were simply not 
employed in print often enough at the time of the framing to provide a 
useful sample size. As a result, as already noted, original meaning 
advocates have effectively been forced to rely on statements of the 
Framers themselves to demonstrate the contemporary understanding of 
the words.
69
 But such an approach effectively collapses original 
meaning into the already discredited—and largely abandoned—inquiry 
into original intent. Secondly, the very notion that the words of a 
particular text may be dispositively ascertained by analysis of word use 
in entirely unrelated contexts ignores both the purposive nature of the 
terms’ contextual use and the inherent ambiguity of many words.  
Moreover, originalism ignores a second level of ambiguity that 
plagues originalist inquiry. Not only is there ambiguity as to a coherent 
single meaning at the time of ratification, there is also an ambiguity as 
to whether the term was understood to signal an understanding that the 
meaning of the words could in fact change over time.
70
 This does not 
mean that the words failed to set outer linguistic limits on interpretation. 
It means, rather, that within those boundaries, original meaning fails to 
resolve this question of interpretive philosophy. 
                                                                                                                     
consistently adhere to the position that the Amendment was designed to protect the 
‘Blackstonian’ self-defense right.” Id. He also “suggested that the Amendment should be 
understood in the context of the compromise over military power represented by the original 
Constitution and the . . . Tenth Amendment[].” Id. Tucker believed, Justice Stevens concluded, 
that the Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right to maintain state militias. Id. 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: 
Original Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 
1123–24 (2006). 
 68. Under principled nonoriginalist textualism, we concede, reasonable people will 
inevitably differ over the proper normative guiding principle to be gleaned from ambiguous 
constitutional text. See discussion supra Part I. Unlike original meaning, however, we do not 
proclaim certainty and objectivity as the primary advantage of our theory. 
 69. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 70. See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 536–41 (2010). 
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As already noted, even if one were to suspend disbelief on these 
concerns, a more serious problem of interpretative philosophy remains. 
To define constitutional terms exclusively by reference to general usage 
of the term at the time of enactment necessarily ignores the political and 
purposive contexts in which those words were included in legally 
operative documents. When words are inserted into a legally operative 
document, it is presumably to reach some sort of “Point B”—to achieve 
an end, or to alter the legal or social topography in one or more ways. 
To be sure, the words may be plagued by ambiguity, or even by “second 
level” ambiguity as to how much interpretive discretion is intended. The 
fact remains, however, that the words do not exist outside of a structural 
and purposive context. To tie those words rigidly to some abstract 
meaning untied to the context in which the legal topography is being 
modified makes no sense. As a consequence of these systemic 
problems, the original meaning interpretative model ultimately gives 
rise to as many or more dangers of strategic manipulation as its 
interpretive predecessor, original intent.
71
 Arguably, original meaning is 
even more dubious than original intent, given that the latter at least 
contemplates an inquiry into collective purpose, thereby avoiding the 
incoherence of non-contextual inquiry.  
The Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which held 
unconstitutional a legislated prohibition against firearms and rejected 
the commonly accepted collective-right interpretation of the Second 
Amendment
72
 in favor of an interpretation adopting an individual right 
to “self-defense,”73 offers a compelling demonstration of originalism’s 
susceptibility to strategic manipulation. This holding, predicated 
completely on originalist interpretive principles, was wholly 
inconsistent with an analysis tethered to the four corners of the 
Constitution’s text.  
Examination of the provision’s text reveals that the Second 
Amendment is comprised of two indispensible components. The first 
clause, what linguists call an “absolute clause” and which the Heller 
majority considered to be a “prefatory clause,” contextualizes the rule: 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Neither the original understanding nor the original intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, for example, is compatible with the result implicitly reached by the originalist 
Justices Thomas and Scalia in their willingness to join Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s 
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). Furthermore, while both Justices Scalia 
and Thomas have objected on originalist grounds to the use of foreign law by the court, both 
have allowed it to color their opinions at one time or another. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988), and Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999), with McIntyre 
v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995), and Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 
906 (1994). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 73. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–85 (2008) 
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“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
state . . . .” The second clause concludes the statement of the rule: “the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” The 
“well regulated Militia” language of the Second Amendment, therefore, 
necessarily qualifies and adds meaning to the phrase “keep and bear 
arms” by providing an unambiguous explanation for the latter clause’s 
existence.
74
 The first clause is just that—a clause. It is not a 
freestanding sentence. It therefore must be viewed as a modification and 
qualification of the second clause, lest it be rendered totally irrelevant or 
incoherent. The first clause is therefore rendered completely incoherent 
by a construction of the second clause as the creation of an individual, 
rather than a collective, right to own weapons. Indeed, the first clause 
represents the only point in the entire document where the 
Constitution’s text explicitly explains the purpose for one of its 
directives. Arguments that the two clauses are effectively independent
75
 
or that “the Second Amendment has exactly the same meaning that it 
would have had if the preamble had been omitted”76 are therefore 
contrary to uncontroversial principles of linguistic construction.
77
 
Inasmuch as an understanding of both components of a purposeful 
statement are essential to an assessment of a provision’s meaning, 
exclusive reliance on the first clause of the Second Amendment cannot 
be omitted or wished away in favor of the second clause.
78
 Yet the 
Heller majority, on the basis of strategically cherry-picked historical 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 577–78. 
 75. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577; Nelson Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the 
Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 229, 237 
(2008). 
 76. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577; see also Lund, supra note 75, at 237. As a matter of common 
sense, it is also worth noting that the prefatory clause of a statement and a “preamble,” properly 
understood, are not fungible concepts. Individual directives of a piece of legislation, for 
example, are independently understandable in the absence of the document’s preamble, which 
serves to explain the document’s purpose and underlying philosophy. A sentence comprised of 
two clauses, on the other hand, is incoherent in the absence of its preface.  
 77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 665 (“Blackstone described an interpretive approach that gave far 
more weight to preambles than the Court allows. Counseling that ‘[t]he fairest and most rational 
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the 
law was made, by signs the most natural and probable,’ Blackstone explained that ‘[i]f words 
happen to be still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context; with which it may 
be of singular use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or 
intricate. Thus, the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of 
parliament. In light of the Court’s invocation of Blackstone as ‘the preeminent authority on 
English law for the founding generation,’ its disregard for his guidance on matters of 
interpretation is striking.”) (quoting 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59–60 (1765) 
(internal citations omitted)); Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10 n.6, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(No. 07-290) [hereinafter Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English]. 
 78. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English, supra note 77, at 11 n.6. 
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materials, concluded that the “prefatory clause” of the Second 
Amendment
79
 should effectively be ignored in favor of the “operative 
clause” of the Amendment.80 It did so in order to justify an 
interpretation creating an individual right entitling Americans to possess 
firearms for purposes of their “self-defense.” Solely on the basis of the 
four corners of constitutional text, however, there is no coherent way 
such an interpretive conclusion could be reached—at least in a 
principled manner. The Heller decision thus stands as an illustration of 
the ideologically manipulative nature of the originalist inquiry.
81
 The 
“Point B” that the provision was designed to fulfill—explicitly revealed 
by the text itself—was ignored. Even individuals commonly associated 
with conservative scholarship and jurisprudence charged that the 
originalist opinion was politically motivated and wholly unprincipled as 
a matter of constitutional interpretation. They suggested that Heller was 
merely “faux originalism”82 and that Justice Scalia’s brand of 
originalism falls short of “true” originalist values.83 But the holding’s 
                                                                                                                     
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 80. The majority detached the “operative clause” of the Second Amendment from its 
“prefatory clause” in order to analyze each clause independently, arguing that “[t]he former does 
not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.  
“[A]part from [a] clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of 
the operative clause.” Id. at 578. Then, on the basis of historical analysis of the original meaning 
of the textual elements within each separate clause, it concluded that the operative clause of the 
Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation,” while the prefatory clause exists to “prevent elimination of the militia.” Id. at 
592, 599 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason 
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-
defense and hunting.”). The majority’s dicta, however, stated that modern military weapons—
“arms that are highly unusual in society at large”—are inappropriate for self-defense. Id. at 627. 
By creating a right to possess weapons that are irrelevant to militias, the majority, therefore, 
effectively divorced the right to bear arms from any concern for the militia, and, in so doing, 
decoupled the operative clause of the Second Amendment from its prefatory clause. See Richard 
Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/defense-looseness (arguing that Heller is “evidence that the 
Supreme Court, in deciding its constitutional cases, exercises a freewheeling discretion strongly 
flavored with ideology”). 
 81. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
 82. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 80 (“Originalism without the interpretive theory that the 
Framers and the ratifiers of the Constitution expected the courts to use in construing 
constitutional provisions is faux originalism.”). 
 83. Professor Steven Calabresi, for example, essentially refutes those aspects of 
originalism that lend themselves to undesirable results and, in so doing, fills those gaps that lend 
themselves to criticism. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor 
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 663, 664 (2009) (“In addressing these particular 
topics and constitutional provisions, Professor Calabresi has relied on, and tried conscientiously 
to apply, the theoretical framework of original public meaning textualism that I learned from 
Justice Scalia and Judge Robert H. Bork. Professor Balkin has now powerfully challenged that 
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key passage—“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle 
that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its 
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning’”84—is unquestionably originalist 
in methodology. The Court’s use of originalist methodology to 
effectuate a strategic political outcome therefore evinces the untenable 
nature of the paradigm.  
This danger is considerably more insidious in the case of 
originalism than for any other interpretive model. The primary reason 
for the unique susceptibility of originalist meaning inquiry to 
surreptitious ideological manipulation is the inherent intellectual 
inaccessibility of originalism’s historical inquiry to most members of 
the legal profession. Lawyers are, of course, trained as attorneys, not as 
professional historians.
85
 It is therefore difficult for them to assess 
reliance on historical sources. Indeed, the fact that Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, which purported to employ originalist meaning inquiry, 
reached a conclusion consistent with his own ideological perspective 
while Justice Stevens, claiming to draw on the exact same body of 
historical data, reached the exact opposite historical conclusion, 
underscores this susceptibility.
86
 
                                                                                                                     
framework.”). Professor Calabresi thus attempts to distance originalist theory itself from 
questionable application by Justice Scalia.  
[Professor Balkin] says that the constitutional regime we actually live under is 
one of living constitution originalism, not Scalia-style originalism, and his 
implication is that we ought to be living constitution originalists because the 
Scalia project is unworkable . . . . Among the examples of unworkable 
conclusions that Scalia reaches, he cites the inability to justify the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and the 
extension of the Equal Protection Clause to apply to women. . . . [W]e think all 
these outcomes are correct applying Scalia-style originalism, even if Scalia 
himself has not realized that. 
Id. at 687–88 (footnotes omitted). This argument seems akin to a rebranding effort with the goal 
of redefining the nature of originalism as distinct from Justice Scalia’s interpretive philosophy. 
The admission that so-called “Scalia-style originalism” has not been applied correctly by “Scalia 
himself” is, itself, a compelling example of how the originalist model can be corrupted by even 
the most celebrated of its stalwarts.  
 84. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
 85. Indeed, the selective nature of originalism’s historical inquiry has been criticized by 
historians for its lack of professionalism. See Cornell supra note 57, at 639. 
 86. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 80 (“The majority [in Heller] . . . was engaged in . . . ‘law 
office history.’ Lawyers are advocates for their clients, and judges are advocates for whichever 
side of the case they have decided to vote for. The judge sends his law clerks scurrying to the 
library and to the Web for bits and pieces of historical documentation. When the clerks are the 
numerous and able clerks of Supreme Court Justices, enjoying the assistance of the capable 
staffs of the Supreme Court library and the Library of Congress, and when dozens and 
sometimes hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have been filed, many bulked out with the fruits of 
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Despite its promises, originalism fails to provide a clear path to 
consistent, predictable, or neutral constitutional adjudication. The fact 
that, despite its glaring structural flaws, originalism has largely 
maintained its prominence among the conservative judiciary and has 
even been endorsed by opportunistic members of the progressive 
academy in order to validate progressive ends
87
 speaks to the general 
paradigm’s ultimate power not as a principled interpretive methodology, 
but rather as little more than a weapon of populist manipulation.
88
 
C.  Originalist Construction 
Yet another form of originalist analysis has emerged in recent 
years—“originalist construction” (also referred to as “new 
originalism”).89 In the words of two leading observers of originalist 
development, “[m]any originalists believe that it is important to 
distinguish between two distinct aspects of constitutional practice: 
                                                                                                                     
their authors’ own law-office historiography, it is a simple matter, especially for a skillful 
rhetorician such as Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense of his position . . . . But it was 
not so simple in Heller, and Scalia and his staff labored mightily to produce a long 
opinion . . . that would convince, or perhaps just overwhelm, the doubters. The range of 
historical references in the majority opinion is breathtaking, but it is not evidence of 
disinterested historical inquiry. It is evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to produce 
snow jobs.”); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Wages of Originalist Sin: District of Columbia v. 
Heller 1 (July 17, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162338 (“[Justice Scalia’s] 
lengthy exposition of the Second Amendment is bad history—simplistic “law-office” history 
that ignores the complexities of historical research.”); Sanford Levinson, Some Preliminary 
Reflections on Heller, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/some- 
preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html (“[Both] opinions exhibit the worst kind of ‘law-office 
history,’ in which each side engages in shamelessly (and shamefully) selective readings of the 
historical record in order to support what one strongly suspects are pre-determined positions.”); 
Mark Tushnet, More on Heller, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008 
/06/some-preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html (“[B]oth Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens 
assert – laughably to a real historian – that the Second Amendment had only one meaning at the 
framing, and that that meaning was for all practical purposes universally shared.”) 
 87. See discussion infra Section I.D. 
 88. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 661 (2009) (“[A] form 
of democratization of the market for constitutional ideas has broadened the audience of concern 
for constitutional methodologies, thereby making populist methodologies, and the populist 
features of individual methodologies, bear greater emphasis. Originalism’s proponents have 
taken advantage of this dynamic by speaking of originalism in simple and transparent terms, by 
highlighting the putative limitations originalism places on judicial elites, and by emphasizing 
originalism’s distinctively American character.”); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 
550, 554–55 (2006) (arguing that promoting originalism was a deliberate effort by President 
Ronald Reagan’s Justice Department to rally Americans against a Federal Judiciary it perceived 
as a threat to the conservative political agenda). 
 89. Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 12, 22 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 
2011). 
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constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.”90 They 
explain that pursuant to this dichotomy,  
there are two different steps in the process of understanding 
and applying a legal text. The first is interpretation. When 
we interpret a legal text, we look for its linguistic meaning. 
The second step is construction. When we construe a 
constitutional provision, we determine the legal effect of 
the text: in other words, construction enables officials to 
apply the text.
91
  
Originalists who favor this dichotomy believe that there often is a need 
to supplement original meaning analysis (interpretation) with a broader 
interpretive discretion of application, “because our Constitution 
contains provisions that are abstract and vague.”92 Why develop the 
“interpretation–construction” dichotomy? Why not simply employ a 
pure original meaning inquiry? The answer, according to Professor 
Lawrence Solum, is that recognition of the dichotomy by at least some 
leading originalist scholars “explicitly acknowledges what we might 
call the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy: The original meaning 
of the text does not fully determine constitutional doctrine or its 
application to particular cases.”93 
It would no doubt be possible to spend many pages exploring this 
“new” (or perhaps more accurate would be “even newer,” or—in a 
manner reminiscent of advertisements for laundry detergent—“new and 
improved”) originalism, by exploring the nuances in the arguments of 
all of those respected scholars who have advocated such a position.
94
 
Because this Article is about far more than just originalism, however, 
we have deemed such a detailed inquiry beyond the scope of our 
endeavor. Suffice it to say at this point that on its face, the 
interpretation–construction dichotomy effectively gives away the store 
for the entire originalist endeavor. For one thing, it implicitly concedes 
the failure of the entire originalist enterprise, because it expressly 
concedes the impossibility—at least for a significant number of 
important constitutional provisions—of performing the task that 
originalism sets out to perform in the first place. This concession 
renders suspect all conclusions of rigid historical understanding. While 
                                                                                                                     
 90. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE 3 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 4. 
 93. Solum, supra note 89, at 23 (footnote omitted). 
 94. Probably the leading work advocating such a position is KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION ix (1999).  
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it continues to employ the originalist label, the inquiry sanctioned under 
this approach is anything but originalist in its essence. 
These points may be better grasped simply by returning to an 
examination of the goal of developing originalist analysis in the first 
place. Recall that originalism grew out of an understandable desire to 
cabin the interpretive discretion of unrepresentative, unaccountable 
judges who, under the guise of “interpreting” the counter-majoritarian 
Constitution, were all too often trumping the democratic process by 
superimposing their own social policy choices on the majoritarian 
political process. The means for restraining modern judicial review 
contemplated by originalist theory was to confine the interpretive 
options open to modern judges to the understandings of those alive at 
the time of the framing and ratification of the relevant constitutional 
provision. Yet, contrary to this asserted goal, the originalist construction 
school openly concedes the widespread impossibility of successfully 
performing the archaeological and translational task that is the sine qua 
non of true originalist analysis. It replaces it with an indeterminate 
mode of “construction” that permits the very results that originalism 
was designed to avoid—namely, the unrestrained judicial trumping of 
democratically authorized decision making and the implementation of 
textual understandings of which those alive at the time of ratification 
would have been totally unaware. This may well be an appropriate 
means of constitutional construction for those of us who have long 
categorically rejected the entire originalist endeavor as hopeless and 
often manipulative. But it is surely Orwellian to describe this theory as 
“originalist” in any meaningful sense of that term. 
D.  “Progressive” Originalism 
The recent growth of the so-called “progressive” originalist 
movement
95
 provides even stronger support for the view that the 
originalist paradigm is vulnerable to strategic political manipulation. 
Much like the recent “originalist construction” movement,96 progressive 
originalists argue that since original meaning analysis is often 
indeterminate, it requires interpreters to look to sources other than 
constitutional text to determine the Constitution’s meaning.97 On the 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, supra note 13; 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 13; Balkin, Framework Originalism and the 
Living Constitution, supra note 13. 
 96. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
 97. See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism (Illinois 
Public Law Research Paper No. 08-14, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1241655 (arguing that “original meaning originalists explicitly embrace the 
idea that the original public meaning of the text ‘runs out’ and hence that constitutional 
interpretation must be guided by something other than semantic content of the constitutional 
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basis of this perceived duality, progressive originalists have sought to 
reconcile original meaning and nontextualism.
98
 Progressive originalists 
contend that “[t]he choice between original meaning and living 
constitutionalism . . . is a false choice,”99 and that “fidelity to original 
meaning and belief in a living Constitution are not at odds.”100 The 
model, however, is ultimately predicated on the notion that “each 
generation of Americans can seek to persuade each other about how the 
text and its underlying principles should apply to their circumstances, 
their problems, and their grievances.”101 Progressive originalism is thus 
consistent with notions of evolutionary constitutionalism. In this sense, 
it arguably deserves the descriptive label “progressive,” though if that 
term is given its common modern left wing definition the phrase openly 
reveals an ideological grounding. We will therefore assume, for present 
purposes, that the word choice lacks its more common ideological 
association (though if so, then the word choice is unfortunately 
confusing). From the perspective of progressive originalist 
interpretation, the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade102 is deemed 
compatible with the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
103
 In addition, the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
involuntary servitude is viewed as a historical endorsement of radical 
redistribution of wealth.
104
  
One may reasonably debate whether progressive originalism 
constitutes an effort to fashion a principled mode of constitutional 
interpretation or instead merely to provide a fig leaf for imposition of 
left wing ideological views on the electorate, whether it wants them or 
not. In that regard, it is interesting to note that we have yet to discover a 
single interpretive conclusion inconsistent with a progressive 
ideological agenda. More problematic, however, is that it is 
linguistically incoherent to refer to the approach as “originalist” in any 
meaningful sense of the term.  
We do not mean to suggest that originalist interpretation cannot in 
any way take into account technological advances. For example, an 
                                                                                                                     
text.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s 
“Justifying Originalism”, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 30, 2007), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legalt 
heory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html. 
 98. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 13, at 551–
52. 
 99. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 293. 
 100. Id. at 311. 
 101. Id. at 301 (emphasis added); see also Powell, supra note 2. 
 102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 103. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 311–12. 
 104. Bravin, supra note 13 (quoting Professor Akhil Amar) (“[The] Constitution turns out 
to be way more liberal than conservative. The framers of the 14th Amendment were radical 
redistributionists. The 13th Amendment frees the slaves and there’s no compensation . . . . It’s 
the biggest redistribution of property in history.”). 
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originalist could reasonably extend the First Amendment right of free 
expression to television, radio, or movies. But as we said in our 
criticism of originalist construction,
105
 if originalism is to perform its 
intended function of restraining an unaccountable judiciary from 
disrupting democratic choices, historical understandings of 
constitutional text must place at least some meaningful restraint on the 
judicial review power. In contrast to interpretive modification adopted 
in light of technological developments, originalism cannot rationally 
produce a constitutional result that, while physically possible at the time 
of drafting, would have come as a complete shock to all those alive at 
that time. Thus, at a time when women could not even vote, it would no 
doubt have shocked everyone alive at the time of ratification to suggest, 
as Professor Jack Balkin does, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause
106
 may be construed to protect a woman’s right to an 
abortion.
107
 This is not necessarily to conclude that no plausible mode 
of constitutional interpretation could reach such a conclusion. We need 
not reach that issue for present purposes.
108
 The main point is that it is 
Orwellian to characterize this conclusion as “originalist.” In effect, use 
of the term appears to be designed to do little more than add a wholly 
undeserved veneer of legitimacy to a theory that in reality has little 
connection to the core concept of originalism. Progressive originalism 
is, then, originalism in name only. 
Much has been written about the validity of progressive 
originalism.
109
 Probably because progressive originalism bears a 
number of important similarities to the originalist construction 
approach, some of the most ardent originalists have embraced the 
paradigm as a positive development for constitutional interpretation.
110
 
A number of originalist stalwarts, for example, have endorsed 
progressive originalist contentions that “constitution makers from the 
American Constitution to the present day have . . . included rights 
guarantees that sound in the vague and abstract language of 
principles,”111 or that “constitutional silences and open spaces reflect 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
 106. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 107. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 311–12, 319. 
 108. But see discussion infra Section III.C.  
 109. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 405 
(2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus A Thought Or Two About 
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 384 (2007); Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political 
Potency of “Text and Principle”, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 417 (2007); Ethan Leib, The 
Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 353 (2007); John O. 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 
24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 372 (2007). 
 110. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 109, at 381; see also Calabresi & Fine, 
supra note 83, at 663–65. 
 111. Balkin, Framework Originalism, supra note 13, at 554.  
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the fact that adopters are not omniscient and cannot prepare for every 
eventuality.”112 In so doing, however, these commentators have 
effectively abandoned the core notions underlying originalist thought. 
II.  NONTEXTUALISM AS A THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES 
At the opposite end of the interpretive spectrum are those scholars 
and jurists who believe that the Constitution’s text should not restrict 
the judiciary in the exercise of the judicial review power.
113
 If any of 
these approaches were to be accepted, those who interpret and enforce 
the Constitution would effectively be vested with unrestrained authority 
either to restrict or to empower government in its exercise of regulatory 
authority over its citizens. It is important to understand this potential 
two-way ratchet created by nontextualist versions of judicial review. If 
even the unambiguous dictates of controlling legal text may properly be 
ignored, there is nothing to prevent the judiciary from refusing to 
enforce textually imposed limits on majoritarian action, or from 
restricting the majoritarian branches even where text cannot be 
rationally construed to impose such a limit. Paradoxically, then, 
acceptance of one or another of the forms of nontextualism 
simultaneously threatens constitutional democracy with both too much 
and too little judicial review—either unduly interfering with 
majoritarian rule, or leaving majoritarian rule dangerously uncontrolled.   
The theory of nontextualism embodies a broad range of interpretive 
philosophies and rationales. However, at its core nontextualism 
represents either a form of linguistic deconstruction—what we term 
“linguistic chaos”—or the notion of an “unwritten” constitution 
grounded in foundational moral premises drawn from one or another 
form of natural law. 
A.  Linguistic Chaos and the Constitution 
Textual deconstructionists espouse the view that because words 
contained in even governing texts are capable of infinite plausible 
meanings, the words of the Constitution effectively place no limits on 
an interpreting judge.
114
 On the basis of the epistemological 
assumptions underlying linguistic deconstruction, the Constitution’s 
textual directives are, at their most fundamental level, capable of an 
infinite number of constructions. Proponents of such a theory draw their 
interpretive insights from the works of literary theorists of the 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 83, at 672. 
 113. The notion that the Constitution’s linguistic boundaries may be formally ignored was 
first introduced in HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 5 (1937).  
 114. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 43 (1980) (“The objectivity 
of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so physically 
convincing.”). 
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“deconstructionist” school, who fashioned their theories in the context 
of interpreting literary texts.
115
 Words perform a very different function, 
however, when employed in legally operative texts, such as the 
Constitution, which are designed to formally implement political will 
and to guide and control private and public behavior. If words are to 
provide absolutely no limits at all, neither function can be effectively 
performed. Under the deconstructionist model, our system of 
constitutional democracy would be relegated to a chaos not unlike 
Alice’s encounter with Humpty Dumpty in Wonderland, where every 
word, untethered from predictable meaning, means just what an 
individual interpreter chooses for it to mean, “neither more nor less.”116 
The most fundamental problem with the linguistic chaos theory is that 
the notion that words are capable of infinite construction simply defies 
common sense.
117
 Indeed, there would hardly be a point to a written 
Constitution in the first place—much less explicit provision of a formal 
amendment process—if this were so.  
To be sure, it does not automatically follow from a rejection of 
linguistic deconstruction that words have only a rigid, single meaning. 
Indeed, we have already demonstrated the fallacies of such an 
assumption in our critique of originalism. As Professor Gerald Graff has 
perceptively pointed out, recognition that words do not have fixed 
meanings does not logically lead to the conclusion that the choice of 
particular wording in text provides a total absence of linguistic 
limitation.
118
 That words lack a single determinate meaning does not 
logically imply that they have no meaning. Most disturbing, from the 
perspective of American political theory, is that linguistic 
                                                                                                                     
 115. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 379 (1982) 
(discussing deconstruction). For a compelling survey of the law and literature school, see 
Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); 
Symposium: Law and Literature, supra note 18. 
116. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS 
CARROLL 214 (First Modern Library ed. 1936) (“When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in a 
rather scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.”). This 
passage has appeared in 250 judicial decisions in the Westlaw database as of April 19, 2008, 
including two United States Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 
n.18 (1978) (“In dissent, Mr. Justice Powell argues that the meaning of ‘actions’ in § 7 is ‘far 
from “plain,”’ and that ‘it seems evident that the “actions” referred to are not all actions that an 
agency can ever take, but rather actions that the agency is deciding whether to authorize, to 
fund, or to carry out.’ [F]rom this bare assertion, however, no explanation is given to support the 
proffered interpretation. This recalls Lewis Carroll’s class advice on the construction of 
language . . . .”); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 n.6 (1968). 
 117. In fact, if words are capable of infinite meaning, then no one could be certain what is 
meant when we say that such “theory makes no sense.” Nor could anyone be sure what this 
footnote means.  
 118. Gerald Graff, “Keep Off The Grass,” “Drop Dead,” and Other Indeterminacies: A 
Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 406 (1982). 
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deconstruction would effectively serve as an interpretive vehicle for the 
judicial implementation of the personal policy preferences of a wholly 
unrepresentative and unaccountable constitutional interpreter.
119
 Our 
system of judicial review has never openly proceeded on such an 
interpretive philosophy—nor could it and still stay faithful to the 
democratic ideal.
120
  
B.  The “Unwritten” Constitution: Alternative Rationales 
Of only marginal superiority to the “linguistic deconstruction” 
school of interpretation is the “unwritten Constitution” model. 
Advocates of this model need not resort to linguistic deconstruction 
because they believe that whatever the Constitution’s text does in fact 
dictate, an interpreter may nevertheless find within it unwritten 
directives which possess the exact same legally trumping force as do its 
written provisions.
121
 Since these directives are unwritten, the 
interpreter of course need not rely on the preposterously simplistic 
notion of linguistic chaos; instead, the “interpreter” can simply make it 
all up as he goes along, freed from the annoying restraint of a written 
text. Scholars rely on two alternative rationales to support recognition of 
so sweeping a power of judicial review, and it is to a description of both 
that we now turn.  
1.  Continual Reaffirmation 
One group of scholars has argued that for the Constitution to have 
force in the present day, the document’s directives must be constantly 
reassessed and reaffirmed.
122
 Professor Paul Brest, for example, has 
suggested that because the Constitution’s Framers long ago went to 
their final reward, what they wrote cannot reasonably be deemed 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 
411, 424 (1981). If Professor Tushnet were a judge, in each case, he would ask, “[W]hich result 
is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to advance the cause of socialism? Having decided 
that, [he] would write an opinion in some currently favored fashion of Grand Theory.” Id. 
 120. For a history of the Constitution as a central feature of counter-majoritarianism in 
democratic theory, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 
(1991). 
 121. See Grey, supra note 17, at 706 n.9, 717 (arguing that courts should be able “to 
articulate and apply contemporary norms not demonstrably expressed or implied by the 
Framers” because “there was an original understanding, both implicit and textually expressed 
[in the Ninth Amendment], that unwritten higher law principles had constitutional status”). 
 122. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 
(1984) (arguing that in “constitutional politics,” the people speak, whether formally through 
constitutional amendments or informally through “constitutional moments” whereby a 
“mobilized mass of American citizens express their assent through extraordinary institutional 
forms” (footnotes omitted)). 
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binding on modern society.
123
 A narrower alternative to the approach, 
associated with Professor Bruce Ackerman, suggests that in the rare 
instance in which a “constitutional moment” occurs—instances in 
which the nation implicitly bonds in its understanding of the need for 
fundamental change in the Constitution’s DNA without proceeding 
through the formal amendment process set out in Article V
124—the 
Constitution’s text should be deemed to have been legally altered.125  
Presumably, when judges fashion new constitutional directives not 
grounded in text, they are assumed to be engaging in something akin to 
this process of “continual reaffirmation.” A constitutional right to 
personal privacy, for example, is found to exist because we as a society 
have deemed it so, even without recourse to the amendment process 
described in Article V.
126
 It is, then, ultimately because—and only 
because—the Constitution is effectively re-ratified in the popular mind, 
that we may accept it without ceding unconscionable control to the dead 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 2, at 225 (“Even if the adopters freely consented to the 
Constitution . . . this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the founding document, 
for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt the Constitution, and 
those who did are dead and gone.”). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 125. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 47–50 (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman, 
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489 (1989); Ackerman, supra 
note 122, at 1050 (arguing that judges who act as agents of the people and legislate in rare 
constitutional moments act more democratically than legislators who serve special interests and 
escape from public accountability during the course of the ordinary political process); see also 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1937); West Cost Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379, 379–80 (1937); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 1, 10 
(2000). 
 126. See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 32–34 (suggesting that while new propositions may be 
identified as part of the nation’s Constitution, albeit not part and parcel of the Constitution’s 
text, premises that are believed to abandon the “indissoluble character of the Union” may be 
unconstitutional even if they are adopted in absolute accordance with the Article V amendment 
process); see also Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, supra note 125, at 
456–57. These perspectives seem suspiciously similar to Sir Edward Coke’s obiter dictum in Dr. 
Bonham’s Case: 
[T]he common law doth controll Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge 
them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against Common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
controll it, and adjudge such Act to be void; and, therefore . . . [s]ome statutes 
are made against Common Law and right, which those who made them, would 
not put them in execution . . . . 
THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 275–76 (Steve Sheppard ed., vol. 
1 2003). This notion—that constitutional law may be struck down based on nontextual 
principles of common law or natural justice not located within the constitutional text—has been 
rejected as a maxim of American constitutional law. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 160–62 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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hand of the past.
127
 Under this “continual reaffirmation” model, the 
Constitution is seen by nontextualists as a document that continuously 
moves beyond its text and its historical origins.
128
 But there are serious 
problems with such a theory. The notion that a properly enacted law 
loses its controlling force once the last lawmaker involved in its 
enactment passes is a most curious one. Advocates of such a view 
provide no example of such a strange practice of law modification. 
Indeed, all of the examples that come to mind strongly suggest the exact 
opposite conclusion. For example, it is likely that the scholars who 
advocate this position do not believe that either the Civil Rights Act of 
1871
129
 or the Sherman Antitrust Act
130
 have automatically lost their 
legal force merely because those involved in their enactment failed to 
obtain eternal life. But if that is so, it is unclear why the directives of the 
United States Constitution—under whose governing structure both 
statutes were executed—should be treated any differently. 
Even if one were to suspend disbelief concerning this 
insurmountable flaw in the argument, serious problems continue to 
plague this “continual reaffirmation” theory of constitutional 
interpretation. Given the theory’s logical premise, once the last framer 
or ratifier passes on, the entire document loses its force—not only those 
provisions which happened to be disliked by an ideologically driven 
group of scholars. For example, absent some form of societal 
“reaffirmation,” neither the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause nor 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause continues to be 
binding law. Thus, we must find an acceptable method to determine 
whether such “reaffirmation” exists. This concern presumably is of 
enormous importance to the continued vitality of all the Constitution’s 
provisions. Yet no one has even bothered to suggest a detailed 
procedure by which we are supposed to determine whether the 
Constitution’s provisions have been reaffirmed. Absent dispositive 
proof of continued popular affirmation of all of the document’s 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 2, at 236. For a comprehensive treatment of so-called 
“dead hand arguments” see Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008). 
 128. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, supra note 125. Professor 
Ackerman argues that the public acceptance of the New Deal, given its inconsistency with the 
Constitution’s text, effectuated a legally binding amendment to the Constitution. While 
Professor Ackerman concedes that this process of amendment is inconsistent with Article V, he 
contends that similar “constitutional moments” occurred when the post-Civil War amendments 
were adopted and at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.; See also Brest, supra note 2; 
Samaha, supra note 127; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 448 (1987) (arguing that the New Deal “altered the constitutional system in 
ways so fundamental as to suggest that something akin to a constitutional amendment has taken 
place”). 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
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provisions, then, we are left with complete constitutional chaos. No 
advocate of this approach appears ever to have recognized the 
inexorable implications of its premise. 
The most logical method for determining reaffirmation, we suppose, 
would be some sort of periodic plebiscite—a process that (depending 
upon the percentage of favorable votes deemed necessary for 
reaffirmation) might well undermine the Constitution’s inherently 
counter-majoritarian nature, and in any event would no doubt bring an 
enormous amount of uncertainty and unpredictability to constitutional 
law (far more than currently exists). At the very least, it would gut 
Article V’s complex process of amendment. But the scholarly advocates 
of the continual reaffirmation model say nothing about any type of vote. 
To the contrary, they seem more than satisfied with a process that vests 
in the one governmental organ formally insulated from public 
accountability—the Supreme Court—final, unreviewable authority to 
determine whether a particular provision has been reaffirmed. Such an 
approach vests in the Court unlimited authority to ignore constitutional 
restrictions, authorizations, and protections solely on the basis of a 
conclusory assertion that a particular provision has not been 
“reaffirmed.” 
Even more puzzling is their apparent assumption that, through 
imposition of the requirement of continual reaffirmation, these scholars 
are able to condone the creation of new provisions, not merely the 
abandonment of preexisting ones. It is only by such an indefensible non 
sequitur that they can, for example, employ the process as a rationale 
for recognition of an entirely nontextual constitutional right of personal 
privacy.
131
 Ultimately, then, the “continual reaffirmation” model 
amounts more to a result-oriented rhetorical device than a coherent 
theory of constitutional interpretation. This rationale, like linguistic 
deconstruction, fails to explain the purpose of either a written 
Constitution or its formalized amendment process.
132
  
2.  Implicit Maxims 
Advocates of an unwritten Constitution have alternatively sought to 
ground their interpretive approach in the belief that somewhere in the 
interstices of the text are maxims that are implicit. Professor Thomas 
Grey, for example, has argued that numerous nontextual directives are 
necessarily implicit in what is expressly provided in the Constitution’s 
text.
133
 Protection of personal privacy, for example, while not included 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 133. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17; Thomas Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 
(1948); Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. 
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in the Constitution’s text, has on occasion been rationalized as an 
individual right so fundamental to democratic government that it is 
necessarily protected as a constitutional axiom. Pursuant to this logic, 
absence from text is not deemed to be fatal. While these nontextualists 
concede the obvious—that the Constitution is written—they 
nevertheless consider the Court to be empowered to look beyond text to 
the network of ideas and long-term principles that are written nowhere 
but are nevertheless embedded in the “muscle memory of our 
country.”134  
The Invisible Constitution, by Professor Laurence Tribe, represents 
a recent explication of this form of nontextualism. It proceeds on the 
familiar premise that constitutional meaning resides in that which 
cannot be gleaned directly from the document’s text. Professor Tribe 
contends that, unlike the “unwritten constitution” school, his concern is 
predicated on a desire to understand the substance of the Constitution, 
regardless of who attempts to interpret it, by exploring its “invisible, 
nontextual foundations and facets,” rather than the complex 
superstructure of “rules, doctrines, standards, legal tests, judicial 
precedents, legislative and executive practices, and cultural and social 
traditions” that exist “around” it.135 Distinguishing that which is 
“unwritten” from that which is “invisible,” because the former purports 
to rely on concepts external to the Constitution, while the latter relies on 
concepts that are supposedly internal to the Constitution but which 
nevertheless do not appear in the explicit text, however, is not sufficient 
to differentiate this nontextualist theory from the seriously flawed 
versions that preceded it.
136
 Accordingly, we classify the theories 
expounded in The Invisible Constitution as a subset of the “unwritten 
Constitution” school. The view that our highest law is fundamentally 
comprised of numerous indispensable rights and directives that cannot 
necessarily be derived from adherence to the four corners of the 
Constitution’s text is,137 we are asked to believe, irrelevant because 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 247 (1914) [hereinafter Corwin, Basic Doctrine]; Edward S. Corwin, ‘The Higher Law’ 
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928) [hereinafter Corwin, 
Higher Law]. 
 134. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17; Grey, supra note 133; see also CORWIN, supra note 
136; Corwin, Basic Doctrine, supra note 133; Corwin, Higher Law, supra note 133. 
 135. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 10–11.  
 136. See Eric J. Segall, Lost In Space: Laurence Tribe’s Invisible Constitution, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 434, 436 (2009) (“[I]f the word ‘invisible’ were replaced by the word 
‘unwritten’ every time it appears in [Professor Tribe’s] book, the meaning [of his theory] would 
not change.”); cf. John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 5, 22 n.82 (1978); Grey, supra note 17; TRIBE, supra note 17, at 21 (arguing that the 
Constitution’s meaning “resides only in much that one cannot perceive from reading it”). 
 137. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 28–29. Such maxims as: “Ours is a ‘government of the 
people, by the people, for the people’”; “Ours is a ‘government of laws, not men’”; “We are 
committed to the ‘rule of law’”; “Courts must not automatically defer to what elected officials 
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supposedly an overwhelming majority of our society considers these 
rights to be binding.
138
 
In critiquing the “implicit” unwritten Constitution theory, it is 
important to distinguish between what might be called “internal” and 
“external” implicit directives. Recognition of the former represents a 
principled, common sense form of “ancillary” textual analysis. The 
latter, on the other hand, constitutes nothing more than unprincipled, 
result-oriented rationalizations for implementation of the interpreters’ 
ideological preferences. Internal implicit directives are concepts that, 
while not explicit on the face of the text, are both logically and 
practically necessary to assure viability of the textually explicit 
directive. For example, while the First Amendment right of free speech 
makes no explicit reference to either the freedom of thought or the 
freedom of association,
139
 it is appropriate to infer these protections,
140
 
because purely as a common sense matter the freedom of speech cannot 
survive, much less flourish, absent corresponding constitutional 
recognition of these supporting freedoms. In contrast, external implicit 
directives are those that are not found to be essential to the successful 
implementation of an explicit provision, but instead represent nothing 
more than directives that the interpreter happens to conclude are 
foundational to a democratic society.  
The rationale for recognition of this external form of implicit 
constitutional directive basically comes down to this curious argument: 
Certain directives are so “fundamental” that the Framers somehow 
forgot to mention them. This is so despite the Framers’ conscious use of 
extremely broad terminology in much of the document’s text. In effect, 
the nontextualists necessarily assume that the Framers omitted even the 
slightest textual reference to supposedly fundamental elements of our 
governing structure. But such a conclusion borders on the incoherent; if 
                                                                                                                     
decide the Constitution means”; “Government may not torture people to force information out 
of them”; “In each person’s intimate private life, there are limits to what government may 
control”; “Congress may not commandeer states as though they were agencies or departments of 
the federal government”; or “No state may secede from the Union” are, therefore, fundamentally 
constitutional, under this theory, despite the fact that they are found nowhere in the text of the 
Constitution. Id. at 28–29. In addition, Professor Tribe contends that the principles of 
substantive due process as well as nontextual interpretations of the First Amendment are 
included in the Constitution’s “dark matter,” despite the fact that the former are anti-textual and 
the latter are extra-textual. Id. at 29. 
 138. Id. (“None of these propositions may fairly be said to follow from the Constitution’s 
language by anything like standard “legal” arguments . . . their apparent detachment and 
distance from the Constitution’s text does not prevent any of these propositions from being 
identified by nearly everyone as binding elements of our nation’s supreme law.”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. I (referring only to the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and 
assembly). 
 140. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958) (recognizing First Amendment 
freedom of association). 
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the directive were deemed truly foundational at the time of the framing, 
it is inconceivable that the Framers would have omitted even the 
slightest reference to it. In any event, such supposedly implicit 
directives, unlike their textually explicit counterparts, were never 
subjected to the ratification process, and therefore cannot be deemed to 
legally trump decisions made by the democratic process.  
The greatest threat of nontextualism is that it would authorize 
unrepresentative and unaccountable judges to act in a manner 
ominously reminiscent of Platonic philosopher kings. When the words 
of the Constitution’s text are deemed to place no limitation, the 
interpreter is effectively empowered to superimpose his chosen value 
structure on the electorate and lawmakers. It is difficult to imagine a 
greater threat to the foundation of American democracy, grounded in 
precepts of representation and accountability. 
C.  Expansive Construction of the Ninth Amendment 
On occasion, scholars have developed arguments that uniquely 
rationalize the nontextual extension of individual liberties, rather than 
more general constitutional directives. In their efforts to add implicit 
individual rights to the Constitution’s text, nontextualists have relied on 
an expansive reading of the Ninth Amendment, which provides that the 
Constitution’s enumeration of specific rights does not preclude 
recognition of “other” rights.141 Unlike other arguments used to 
rationalize such directives, the argument grounded in the Ninth 
Amendment actually draws on explicit text. The idea that unenumerated 
rights may derive from the Ninth Amendment is, however, hardly an 
inevitable construction of the provision’s text.142 An interpretation of 
                                                                                                                     
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); see TRIBE, supra note 17, 
at 146 (“It is in that sense a cry from within that there is something without, a ray of light from 
an illuminated part of the constitutional galaxy pointing to the existence of constitutional dark 
matter, although not in defining what that dark matter might be.”). 
 142. Professor Tribe suggests that anyone unconvinced that nontextual sources inform 
fundamental facets of the Constitution’s meaning should look to the Ninth Amendment—“the 
most conspicuously visible evidence of invisibility in the Constitution’s text.” TRIBE, supra note 
17, at 141. Whatever else that text might mean, Professor Tribe posits, “it certainly cautions 
against any reading of the rights ‘enumerated’ in the Bill of Rights that would treat those rights 
as a comprehensive and exhaustive list.” Id. at 161. In other words, “there’s more there than 
meets the eye.” Id. at 8. While Professor Tribe claims that nontextualism does not go so far as to 
read rights, such as the right to privacy, directly into the Ninth Amendment, it nevertheless 
endeavors to utilize the provision as a source of law, if once removed by the interpretive 
constructs he offers. Professor Tribe explains: 
That the Ninth Amendment has been explicitly identified by the Supreme Court 
as a source of law in just two other plurality opinions . . . does not diminish the 
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the provision far more consistent with the concept of a limited judiciary 
is that the Ninth Amendment constitutes nothing more than an anti-
preemption provision. In other words, it was included in the Bill of 
Rights exclusively to reinforce the notion that enumeration of 
constitutionally protected rights in Amendments I through VIII was not 
intended to preempt other lawmaking bodies from legislatively 
supplementing those enumerated constitutional rights.
143
 When 
construed in this manner, the Ninth Amendment means only that the 
Bill of Rights should not be considered expressio unius
144
 as a means of 
preempting sub-constitutional sources from creating additional rights. 
Rather, Congress and state legislatures may supplement that list.
145
  
We do not mean to suggest that the broader construction of the 
Ninth Amendment suggested by nontextualists is linguistically 
untenable. One could, we suppose, construe the words “other rights” to 
mean any rights that the counter-majoritarian judicial interpreter 
happens to deem morally appropriate. But absent even the slightest 
textually grounded limitation on such right-creating authority, such an 
unrestrained license to preempt democratically based choices hardly 
seems consistent with either fundamental precepts of democracy or the 
system of checks and balances so important to the Framers. Indeed, 
those scholars on the political left who advocate such a construction 
should be very careful for what they wish. Such an unlimited directive 
could just as easily be employed by conservative jurists to invalidate all 
varieties of economic regulation as unconstitutional interference with 
economic freedom. If the words “other rights” can be construed in one 
direction, they can just as easily be construed in the ideologically 
opposite direction. Under this broader construction of the Ninth 
Amendment, constitutional interpretation is therefore rendered nothing 
more than a political war of all against all where, as Thomas Hobbes 
told us, life is “nasty, brutish, and short.”146 
                                                                                                                     
extent to which its “cry” [from within that there is something without] has 
shaped the Court’s jurisprudence on questions of fundamental rights. 
Id. at 146. Under this method of interpretation, however, any inquiry into the Constitution’s 
“dark matter” inevitably becomes the font of substantive rights that the nontextualist paradigm 
claims to eschew. Id. at 147. 
 143. See MARK GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT (1981); Kurt Lash, The Lost 
Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) (arguing that early courts 
and commentators interpreted the Ninth Amendment as a means of preserving the retained right 
of local self-government); Kurt Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) (arguing that the documentary history of the Ninth Amendment 
establishes that it and the Tenth Amendment were intended to serve as twin guardians of 
federalism). 
 144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009). 
 145. Id. 
 146. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651). 
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The final difficulty with reliance on the Ninth Amendment as a 
textual basis for judicial recognition of nontextually grounded rights 
flows from the supposed source of such rights. According to the Ninth 
Amendment’s strongest judicial advocate, Justice Arthur Goldberg, the 
rights whose existence the amendment recognizes do not flow directly 
from the Ninth Amendment itself. Rather, they are grounded in the 
traditions of our society.
147
 The Ninth Amendment merely 
acknowledges their existence. But if that is so, then the Court’s power 
as ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the counter-majoritarian 
Constitution logically fails to provide the Justices with final say as to 
the scope and meaning of these rights. Hence, even under the broader 
reading of the provision, it is by no means clear that the Court, rather 
than the political branches, possesses authority as ultimate expounder of 
such rights. 
III.  SEEKING A PRINCIPLED ALTERNATIVE: THE “CONTROLLED 
ACTIVISM” INTERPRETIVE MODEL 
For all their supposed differences, the two major schools of 
constitutional interpretation share two fatal characteristics: first, the 
dubiousness of their foundational premise, and second, their inevitable 
degeneration into strategic manipulation. Contrary to the essential goals 
of originalism, which promises to deter judges from injecting personal 
values into the Constitution,
148
 the archeological and conceptual 
problems inherent in that model offer an ideal smokescreen behind 
which judges may pursue their personal moral, political, or economic 
goals with relative impunity. On the other hand, nontextualism similarly 
degenerates into a situation in which judges are allowed to insert their 
own values in place of democratically sanctioned choices. 
Consequently, neither constitutes an appropriate method of adjudication 
for our system of constitutional democracy. 
Proponents of these models have on occasion challenged critics to 
present alternative criteria for interpretation.
149
 We accept that 
challenge, at the outset mindful of the futility of articulating a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that claims to yield determinate results.
150
 
The key to what we call the “controlled activism” model instead is to 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–92 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 148. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. (arguing that before one can reject originalism, one must find another criterion for 
determining the meaning of a provision, lest the “opinion of this Court rest[] so obviously upon 
nothing but the personal views of its Members”).  
 150. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Interpretation for the Twenty-first Century, 
ADVANCE: J. AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2007, at 25 (“It is misguided and 
undesirable to search for a theory of constitutional interpretation that will yield determinate 
results, right and wrong answers, to most constitutional questions. No such theory exists or ever 
will exist.”). 
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candidly embrace the problem of textual ambiguity, and through such 
transparency to find some sort of means of controlling—or at least 
reducing—the risks of abuse. Accordingly, we seek to advance a new 
interpretive paradigm, one that mandates consistently principled results 
even though, on many occasions, reasonable interpreters may use our 
model to plausibly arrive at very different outcomes. Controlled 
activism at the outset confines interpretation to the outer linguistic 
reaches of the Constitution’s text. In the event of linguistic ambiguity, 
the approach employs a principled, candid, and moderately restrained 
form of normative judicial inquiry. 
A.  Determining the Outer Reaches of the Constitution’s Words: Modest 
Exclusionary Textualism 
Limitations on the Court’s role inherent in the concept of 
constitutional democracy require that its interpretation of the 
Constitution’s provisions never contradict the document’s unambiguous 
textual maxims, regardless of any particular Justice’s agreement or 
disagreement with the sociopolitical value of those directives.
151
 
Because the Framers feared unchecked power, they established a 
written Constitution subject to a stringent super-majoritarian process of 
amendment and protected by a counter-majoritarian judiciary. In so 
doing, they shielded certain rights and powers from majority 
encroachment or abuse.
152
 Our suggested method of interpretive 
analysis begins, therefore, with examination of the words that appear on 
the pages of the Constitution. At the outset, our model, whenever 
possible, seeks to decipher the words’ plain meaning or, where no plain 
meaning may be determined, at least the outer limits of what the words 
could reasonably mean in light of a determination of what they cannot 
reasonably be construed to mean.  
In certain instances, text’s plain meaning is ascertainable. For 
example, despite Supreme Court precedent to the contrary,
153
 when the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibits extension of the federal judicial power 
to suits by citizens of a state against “another” state,154 the provision 
cannot rationally be construed, purely as a matter of textual 
construction, to prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens. In other 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial 
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1987). 
 152. See J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 52–55 
(1984); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet 
Classic 2003) (“The interpretation of . . . law[] is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. 
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by . . . judges, as . . . fundamental law.”). 
 153. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3–4, 6, 9 (1890). 
 154. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  
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instances, words in the Constitution’s text will be found to have only 
inclusionary ambiguity. For example, while it will not always be easy to 
determine what the concept of “due process” requires, it should be 
obvious that on its face, it can require only some form of “process” or 
procedure. In other words, on its face the provision establishes only a 
conditional protection of life, liberty, and property; such interests may 
be taken from citizens, as long as proper procedures are followed. This 
must be what the provision means; the concept of “procedural process” 
is redundant—just as the concept of “substantive process” is 
oxymoronic.
155
 Thus, whatever processes ultimately are or are not 
deemed required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, we can readily exclude from the provisions’ scope any 
requirement not concerned with process. In this sense, the provision 
differs dramatically from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, which imposes a protection against substantive results. For 
example, if government were to enact a law providing that African-
Americans are to receive reduced welfare benefits, it would be no 
answer to an equal protection challenge to assert that individuals are 
given a full and fair procedural opportunity to prove that they are not 
African-American. It is the end result of denying individuals benefits 
because they are African-American that constitutes the violation of the 
clause. For this very reason, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling v. 
Sharpe
156
 finding an equal protection component in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is textually impermissible—despite 
the unquestionably legitimate moral goals of such an extension. 
Professor Frederick Schauer has aptly analogized this form of 
exclusionary textual interpretation to a blank canvas: “We know when 
we have gone off the edge of the canvas even though the canvas itself 
gives us no guidance as to what to put on it.”157 While we recognize that 
ours is a modest form of exclusionary textualism, confining 
interpretation to the outer linguistic limits of constitutional text would 
produce dramatic alterations in current constitutional interpretation, as 
our categorical, textually grounded rejection of substantive due process 
clearly demonstrates. The inquiry, in short, is likely to resolve more 
questions than might at first be thought.
158
 
                                                                                                                     
 155. See ELY, supra note 2, at 18 (famously comparing “substantive due process” to “green 
pastel redness”). 
 156. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  
 157. Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 828 
(1982). 
 158. See infra text accompanying note 27. 
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B.  The Limits of Textualism as a Restraint on Judicial Review 
In fashioning our proposed interpretive model, we employ a 
synthesis of a traditional plain meaning rule and our own form of 
modest exclusionary textualism. The plain meaning rule has long been 
applied in the field of legislative interpretation.
159
 It dictates that when 
words are linguistically unambiguous, an interpreter may not resort to 
external sources to contradict the inexorable implications of that 
unambiguous meaning. In this sense, the analysis operates much like the 
parol evidence rule has long operated, free from controversy, in the law 
of contract interpretation. Under this rule of contractual interpretation, 
parties to a written contract are prevented from contradicting or 
amending the contract’s plain terms by seeking to admit interpretive 
evidence extrinsic to that contract.
160
 Similarly, in the face of a finding 
of textual unambiguousness, constitutional interpreters may not be 
permitted to suggest—in light of Framers’ intent, original meaning, 
specious linguistics, or unwritten maxims—that words mean something 
other than what they say. In the interest of avoiding strategic 
manipulation and legislative deception, unwavering adherence to the 
Constitution’s plain meaning is essential, whenever its words lend 
themselves to such a construction. As the Supreme Court has reasoned 
in the context of statutory interpretation, it “is elementary that the 
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the 
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”161 
To be sure, there exist only a relatively few provisions of the 
Constitution that readily lend themselves to such a mode of 
construction. But acceptance of our form of modest exclusionary 
textualism would nevertheless significantly alter the current topography 
of constitutional law. For example, when the Tenth Amendment 
confines rights reserved to the states to those not granted to the federal 
government,
162
 the text is unambiguously telling us that the sole 
constitutional basis for restricting federal power is the absence of 
constitutional authorization: States retain only those powers not granted 
to the federal government. Consequently, the question of whether a 
given power is reserved to the states must be resolved exclusively by 
determining whether that power is on the federal government’s checklist 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (holding that when 
statutory language is “plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation 
does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion”). 
 160. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981). 
 161. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.  
 162. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
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of enumerated powers.
163
 It is true that this conclusion does not tell us 
exactly what powers the constitutional grants of authority to Congress 
do or do not include. But it does tell us that this question provides the 
sole basis of debate. Thus, decisions such as Hammer v. Dagenhart,
164
 
where the Court rationalized its constitutional rejection of federal 
legislation exclusively on the basis of a finding that this particular 
exercise of Congress’s commerce power invaded an area of protected 
states’ rights, are improper, simply as a matter of four corners textual 
construction. 
Under exclusionary textualism, the Court’s controversial decision in 
National League of Cities v. Usery
165
 is also improper, because the text 
of the Commerce Clause plainly protects the states against federal 
encroachment only when congressional action reaches beyond the limits 
specified in the Constitution’s checklist of enumerated powers.166 Since 
a reasonable construction of the commerce power, combined with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizes the federal government to 
regulate hours and wages of employees where interstate commerce is 
impacted, the explicit text of the Tenth Amendment unambiguously 
establishes the absence of any state insulation from federal regulation.  
On the other hand, when Article I, Section 8,
167
 enumerates specific 
powers, under the interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the structure of the provision’s text unambiguously rejects the 
notion that any one of those powers—for example, the commerce 
power—provides the federal government with unlimited legislative 
authority.
168
 The meaning of Article I’s enumeration of powers, 
combined with the Tenth Amendment, is that the federal government is 
designed to be one of limited powers.
169
 Absent this conclusion, neither 
express reservation of all undelegated power to the states in the Tenth 
Amendment nor specific enumeration of congressional powers in 
Article I makes sense. As Chief Justice John Marshall noted, the 
concept of enumeration necessarily implies something not 
enumerated.
170
 
The linguistic element of our controlled activism model 
accomplishes two things. First, it requires an interpreting court to 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Redish & Drizin, supra note 151, at 9–10. 
 164. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Hammer was overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
103, 115–17 (1941), but conservatives continue to argue for a constitutionally insulated sphere 
of states’ rights. 
 165. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); id. at 851–52 (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the 
application of federal minimum wage and overtime laws to state employees). 
 166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Redish & Drizin, supra note 151, at 11. 
 170. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824). 
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confine itself to the outer linguistic limits imposed by uncontroversial 
consensus usage of the terms—a requirement which, as we have already 
shown,
171
 would have a significant impact on established constitutional 
doctrine. Second, it expressly abandons (and prohibits) any inquiry into 
the original meaning of the words of the text.
172
 
It is important to understand the differences between our modest 
form of textualism and the theory of original meaning analysis, which 
we critiqued earlier.
173
 For one thing, while originalist meaning analysis 
seeks a single dispositive meaning of constitutional text, our analysis, 
for the most part,
174
 imposes a more modest form of exclusionary 
textualism. We generally do not find a single definitive meaning of 
words; rather, we seek primarily to exclude particular interpretations 
that cannot rationally be reconciled with the other linguistic reaches of 
the words. While it would be either naïve or disingenuous to believe 
that originalist analysis will often lead to a definitive understanding of 
text, an inquiry into the outer linguistic reaches of present meaning is 
far simpler and, usually, far less controversial or vulnerable to 
ideologically driven manipulation. To take an extreme example where 
plain meaning of text provides the primary focus, any judge who asserts 
that a fish qualifies as a tree will immediately be revealed as nothing 
more than a result-oriented manipulator and an abuser of his interpretive 
power. Moreover, we avoid many of the pitfalls of originalism because 
our plain meaning textualism employs present meaning analysis. 
Because we do not purport to seek out the definitive meaning of every 
word, we consider ourselves freed from a slavish obligation to explore 
obscure, arcane, and usually unresolvable debates over historical 
understandings of the text. We employ only a type of what can be 
described as “no brainer” textualism, where there necessarily exists a 
clear consensus as to contemporary understanding of the term or phrase 
in question—or at least what the phrase or term does not mean.  
Is it conceivable that unambiguous historical interpretation of those 
terms differed dramatically from such current “no brainer” 
understandings? It is possible, we suppose—though at least as a general 
matter we seriously doubt this would prove to be a serious problem. But 
on the basis of an ex ante cost–benefit analysis, we have shaped our 
interpretive model to categorically prohibit any debate about historical 
understandings of the term. Such inquiries have been shown to be so 
rife with the potential for manipulative, result-oriented historical 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93, 96–97. 
 173. Note that we do not here refer to the theory of “originalist construction,” but for 
reasons already explained that theory is fatally flawed as a form of originalism. See supra text 
accompanying note 34.  
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.  
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selectivity by resort to generally inaccessible and esoteric inquiry that 
we are willing to suffer in a particular case the relatively unlikely 
departure from historical understanding of what are today consensus 
definitions. We do so in an effort to avoid the dangerous historical 
thicket of “original understanding.”175 
What if it could be established, not that the words of the text 
possessed different meanings at the time of the framing, but rather that 
those who drafted and ratified those words in reality intended a very 
different result from that dictated by a natural reading of the words? Our 
answer to that question is basically the same as that given by the 
originalist meaning school: as in the case of the parol evidence rule in 
the law of contracts, where the text is linguistically unambiguous the 
interpreting court is not permitted to consider extra-textual evidence of 
drafters’ intent. It was, after all, the text, not some extraneous 
understanding of the text, that was subjected to the ratification 
process.
176
  
It might be argued that the very idea of so-called “present-meaning 
textualism” is incoherent: Words are chosen by the drafters to get from 
their chosen “Point A” to their chosen “Point B,” and therefore 
contemporary definitions of those words are irrelevant.
177
 The fact that a 
particular word today means X, the argument might proceed, is of little 
importance. What matters instead is whether the word meant X at the 
time it was drafted.
178
 But whatever the logical force of this argument 
were we to assume that uncontroversial ascertainment of historical 
understanding is generally feasible, it is of little force once one 
acknowledges that historical inquiry into the definitive meaning of 
words is all too often a fruitless and dangerous task. The only 
alternative to our “no brainer” exclusionary form of present meaning 
textualism, then, is the wholesale rejection of text as a limit on an 
                                                                                                                     
 175. We should emphasize that once an interpreter passes beyond the stage of exclusionary 
textual analysis, we do not mean categorically to exclude an interpreter’s resort to historical 
sources in shaping the meaning of ambiguous text. However, under the controlled activism 
model, such sources would be solely of persuasive value. For a discussion of that step in our 
model’s analysis, see discussion infra Section III.C. 
 176. But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). In Alden the Court drew on the history, 
structure, and theory of the Constitution to protect nonconsenting states from citizen suits, even 
though the text of the Constitution does not grant such an immunity. Instead, the Alden Court 
relied on external sources of meaning that were not subject to the ratification process. 
 177. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 111–12 (1989) 
(“[T]he presentist insists that to be bound by the statute does not entail being bound by the 
actual human understanding or collective decision that brought the statute into being. But this 
view effectively separates the statute from the source of its authority . . . the fact that the words 
express a specific collective decision made by the designated political authority—is now de-
emphasized or dismissed.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 178. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
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interpreter’s authority. But for reasons explored in detail earlier,179 such 
nontextualist analysis provides a cure far worse than the disease it seeks 
to remedy. To escape the straightjacket of historical inquiry, then, the 
controlled activism model relies on the irrebuttable presumption that 
terminology today means, roughly, what it meant at the time the 
Constitution was drafted. While we concede that, on rare occasion, it is 
at least possible that the contemporary meanings of words may differ 
from eighteenth-century parlance, we are willing to take that risk in 
order to avoid the toxicity of the originalist paradigm and its one-sided 
manipulation of interpretive result.
180
  
Some may question whether our present-meaning exclusionary 
textualism, untied to original understanding, might lead to 
constitutionally incoherent results. For example, the so-called 
“Republican Form of Government” Clause provides that the United 
States “shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form 
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature . . . against domestic Violence.”181 
Divorced from its historical origins, it might be argued, these words 
could reasonably be construed to authorize a state legislature to seek 
federal assistance to stop or prevent spousal abuse, because in today’s 
parlance the words could be understood in this manner. This is so under 
our model, the argument would proceed, even though as a historical 
matter we can be certain that this is not what the words meant, because 
absolutely no one at the time of the framing would have understood 
“domestic violence” in this manner.182 This criticism is flawed, 
however, because one need not resort to a search for originalist meaning 
in order to dispel the specious notion that the words “domestic 
violence” in Article IV could be properly construed to include spousal 
abuse. Rather, one needs merely to employ a form of structural 
textualism, a concept which we can comfortably include as an element 
of our version of “no brainer” exclusionary textualism. The entire 
context of Article IV, Section 4, expresses a concern with the need for 
federal protection of the states from invasion, and the need for the 
federal government to protect the states against violence or insurrection. 
The text of the provision reveals no other conceivable function or 
purpose for the provision as a whole. Thus, by examining exclusively 
                                                                                                                     
 179. See discussion supra Part II. 
 180. See Powell, supra note 2, at 903–04 (arguing that even the Framers themselves 
“shared the traditional common law view—so foreign to much hermeneutical thought in more 
recent years—that the import of the document they were framing would be determined by 
reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words or through the usual judicial process of case-by-
case interpretation”). 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added). 
 182. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 2 (2011). 
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the text of the relevant provision, we are able to conclude that a 
construction of the words “domestic violence” refer to a need for the 
federal government to protect the states from an activity that presents no 
existential threat to the state would render them incoherent, in light of 
their textual context and structure as determined on the provision’s four 
corners. 
There is no reason that a textualist analysis cannot take into account 
the words that appear around the words in question. Words included in 
a purposive text do not appear in a vacuum. Rather, they are intertwined 
within the structure of a provision whose textual four corners can give 
rise to common sense limitations on the scope of interpretation without 
any help from historical inquiry. Indeed, our illustrations of 
exclusionary textualism have already demonstrated such structural 
elements. We gave as an example of our exclusionary textualism the 
constitutional principle that the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 
8,
183
 cannot be construed to include all activities, because such a 
construction would effectively undermine the textually derived notion 
that Article I, Section 8 leaves at least some private activity for 
exclusive state regulation.
184
 We reached this conclusion, not because 
any specific words, viewed in a vacuum, said this, not because of an 
inquiry into the understanding of those at the time of the framing, but 
simply by examining the four corners of the relevant text. Similarly, our 
criticism of the originalist analysis in Heller focused on the majority’s 
failure to focus on the modifying words in the prefatory clause of the 
Second Amendment.
185
 Those words, we argued, rendered a conclusion 
that the operative clause of the provision intended to create a personal 
right incoherent, because such an interpretation rendered the words of 
the prefatory clause useless and therefore meaningless. Once again, our 
“no brainer” present-meaning exclusionary textualism dictates a 
conceptually coherent result without the need for a resort to historical–
etymological analysis. 
C.  Constitutional Interpretation in the Absence of Unambiguous Text: 
Shaping the Contours of the “Controlled Activism” Model 
To fill the void created by intractable linguistic ambiguity, we 
suggest resort to a far more candid, transparent, and principled approach 
to constitutional interpretation. To the extent not prohibited by the 
modest exclusionary textualism filter imposed by our model,
186
 we cede 
to the reviewing court a significant degree of discretion to shape 
constitutional interpretation in accord with what they deem normatively 
                                                                                                                     
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 184. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
 185. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 186. See discussion supra Part III. 
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preferable values. We cede this authority because there exists no real 
alternative; to suggest otherwise—as preexisting models of 
constitutional interpretation have all too clearly shown—is to 
disingenuously disguise what ultimately amounts to value-driven 
decision making in any event. We do so in the hope that such 
transparency will confine constitutional debate to the real issues at 
stake. 
This does not mean that we would impose absolutely no restraints 
on the exercise of the judicial review power in such instances. To the 
contrary, it is solely because we have candidly acknowledged the 
normativity inherent in constitutional interpretation that we are able to 
shape and impose essential restraints on that judicial authority. While 
we recognize that at some level judges inevitably must make 
discretionary calls where text is inescapably ambiguous, controlled 
activism does not constitute an endorsement of unfettered, outcome-
determinative judicial policymaking. It is therefore important to 
understand exactly what restraints our controlled activism model 
imposes on this inevitable normative judicial discretion in construing 
and applying the Constitution. First, it should be recalled that our form 
of textualism, while not bound by the artificial (and often manipulative) 
strictures of originalism, nevertheless places a potentially significant 
restraint on the judiciary’s ability to impose its naked political will on 
the populace by demanding adherence to the four corners of the 
Constitution’s unambiguous text.187 Second, in explicitly choosing a 
normatively driven interpretation of a particular provision, a court 
would be required to recognize the subtle but vitally important 
differences between what we label “Level I” and “Level II” forms of 
normative inquiry. Under the controlled activism model, it is solely the 
Level I form of normative analysis that is properly vested in the 
unaccountable judiciary. 
A court employing Level II analysis asks only how its chosen 
constitutional interpretation of a particular provision alters the political 
topography in the manner most consistent with the chosen sub-
constitutional political or ideological preferences. In undertaking a 
Level II inquiry, the judge effectively asks herself much the same 
question that a legislator asks herself before deciding how to vote on 
proposed legislation. In effect, both rely completely on their 
assessments of normative social policy—that is, the narrowly political 
choices of the decision makers. Under a Level II approach, therefore, 
constitutional interpretation amounts to nothing more than a strategic 
extension of the interpreter’s personal political agenda. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Heller, Roe, and Lochner are illustrative. In each of 
those decisions, the decision maker was not attempting to provide a 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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coherent, principled, and linguistically plausible interpretation of 
ambiguous constitutional text, but rather simply seeking to trump the 
democratic process by employing the guise of counter-majoritarian 
constitutional analysis for what in reality was nothing more than 
ideological preferences.
188
 This type of strategic manipulation is, as we 
have shown, the Achilles’ heel of both originalism and nontextualism. 
Such purely politically driven interpretations on the part of judiciary, 
purposely insulated from the choices of the electorate, are wholly 
unacceptable in a democracy, because courts lack the portfolio of 
accountability and representativeness that provide legislators with their 
political legitimacy. Thus, while both legislators and judicial 
interpreters necessarily exercise a form of normatively based discretion, 
the core premise of democratic theory requires that there must be a 
fundamental difference between legislative choice and the judiciary’s 
constitutional interpretation. 
How can we be certain, without delving into the thicket of judicial 
motivation, that Heller, Roe, and Lochner were grounded in 
impermissible Level II analysis? Because, for reasons already 
discussed, none of them constitutes a plausible interpretation of 
constitutional text. Heller irrationally renders the qualifying clause of 
the Second Amendment irrelevant, thereby rendering its interpretation 
of the operative clause incoherent.
189
 Both Lochner and Roe, on the 
other hand, fail the test of rational textual analysis, because both 
improperly construe the Due Process Clause to oxymoronically create 
substantive guarantees.
190
 
In place of this narrow, purely political form of normative inquiry, 
our controlled activism model requires judges exercising the power of 
judicial review to employ only Level I normative analysis. While Level 
I analysis authorizes normative discretion, the normative inquiry applies 
solely to a determination of the values deemed to underlie a 
linguistically ambiguous constitutional provision, divorced from the 
judge’s narrow, personal political preferences or assessment of 
immediate political consequences. Needless to say, occasions will arise 
where a judge’s Level I inquiry will reach a conclusion that overlaps 
with her Level II normative conclusion. But the key point is that it very 
well may not. More importantly, the outcome-determinative question 
the judge asks herself will differ significantly under the respective 
levels. For example, a debate has long stewed among First Amendment 
scholars as to the ultimate purpose of the constitutional protection of 
free expression, and the values the protection should be deemed to 
advance. While some scholars have focused on the extent to which free 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See discussion supra Part I. 
 189. See discussion supra Section I.B.  
 190. See discussion supra Introduction and Section I.D. 
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expression facilitates the political process,
191
 others have emphasized 
the benefits of free expression to the development of the individual’s 
human faculties.
192
 Because both normative perspectives represent 
plausible constructions of the First Amendment’s text, Justices could, 
under Level I analysis, reasonably choose either. To be sure, we may 
differ with their conclusion, but that fact does not render their 
interpretation implausible or illegitimate. Both represent reasonable 
efforts to explicate the underlying values of the relevant constitutional 
provision.  
On the other hand, under the controlled activism model, a reviewing 
court employing Level I analysis would not be permitted to shape its 
First Amendment doctrine on the basis of its ideological approval of or 
distaste for the substance of the expression in question. Nor could the 
Court properly decide the question on the basis of its assessment of the 
strategic political impact of the speech sought to be regulated. Such 
decision making would fall within the impermissible Level II category 
as decisions driven by ideology or politics. In the place of strategic 
manipulation is judgment: a decision as to the appropriate normative 
ends of the constitutional directive in question. Under a Level I inquiry, 
courts may choose from a variety of plausible interpretations of 
numerous constitutional provisions. But in doing so, they must choose 
an underlying value framework that is both linguistically plausible and 
grounded in considerations that are something other than naked political 
or ideological precepts. To be sure, on occasion ideology may well 
influence the Level I inquiry. For example, a Justice’s strong belief in 
the values of federalism may influence her Level I inquiry into the 
construction of the Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses. But to 
the extent the judge does so, it can only be when his chosen value 
structure is plausibly intertwined with an inquiry into the broader values 
underlying the constitutional provision in question, rather than narrower 
politically strategic goals or values wholly divorced from the four 
corners of that provision.   
As in the case of Level II analysis, there will often be no obviously 
correct answer to the Level I inquiry. Reasonable judges with differing 
perspectives concerning the ends of constitutional law will often differ 
on such foundational issues. But while original meaning advocates 
disguise their normative inquiry behind a veil of historical camouflage, 
the controlled activism model openly acknowledges the creative role of 
                                                                                                                     
 191. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REV. 245. 
 192. See, .e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 
591 (1982). 
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the judicial decision maker in fashioning guiding normative precepts. It 
does so, because the only realistic alternative is no judicial review at all, 
which would unacceptably remove one of the core constitutional checks 
of our system on majoritarian abuse and effectively render the 
Constitution’s counter-majoritarian check all but meaningless. The 
preferable solution, we believe, is first, candid acknowledgement of the 
judiciary’s inherent normative discretion in the exercise of its judicial 
review power, and second, an effort to fashion categorical guidelines to 
confine that discretion to the appropriate performance of the judiciary’s 
function in a democratic society: consistency with the linguistic reaches 
of text and confinement to an assessment of broad constitutional values, 
rather than resort to narrow political purposes.  
It might be suggested that a judge could disguise her Level II values 
as part of what purports to be a Level I inquiry. We certainly do not 
deny such a possibility. But at the very least, under our model the 
critique of the judicial decision’s reasoning would focus on both the 
plausibility and coherence of what purports to be a Level I inquiry—a 
kind of check that lawyers may employ using the tools of their trade, 
rather than pursuing an obscure and often fruitless form of intellectual 
inquiry in which they are not trained, as originalism mandates. 
The controlled activism model imposes yet another type of check on 
the court’s sincerity in its use of Level I analysis. This requirement is 
associated most prominently with Professor Herbert Wechsler’s famed 
“neutral principles” analysis.193 In many ways, Professor Wechsler’s 
framework imposes rather modest limitations on the exercise of the 
judicial review power. Wechslerian “neutral principles” are wholly 
agnostic as to the choices of guiding interpretive principle gleaned from 
a particular constitutional provision. However, under Professor 
Wechsler’s approach, once that principle has been selected, the 
principle chosen may not be altered selectively when it arises in a 
subsequent case for no reason other than political distaste for the result 
that the principle would dictate.
194
 For example, once a court has held 
that the First Amendment protects the right of conservatives to picket at 
a certain location, it may not in a subsequent case refuse to extend the 
same First Amendment protection to socialists who seek to picket, for 
no reason other than ideological disdain for the political position being 
expressed by the would-be picketers in the second case. In a certain 
sense, Professor Wechsler was laying the groundwork for the all-
                                                                                                                     
 193. See Wechsler, supra note 24, at 1, 16–17. 
 194. For a more detailed analysis of Wechsler’s neutral principles, see Martin H. Redish, 
Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intutionism, and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint 
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 76–79 (2007); Taking a Stroll Through Jurassic Park: 
Neutral Principles and the Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 165, 171–74 (1993). 
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important Level I–Level II distinction established by our controlled 
activism model. 
This Wechslerian “neutral principles” requirement serves as the 
policeman for implementation of the Level I–Level II analysis. Where 
no rational basis—tied to the premises of the chosen Level I principle—
for a court’s distinction between one decision and another exists, the 
two decisions, grouped together, may be seen as a thinly veiled 
implementation of what in reality is an unacceptable Level II analysis. 
Above all, the controlled activism model requires transparency and 
candor on the part of the constitutional interpreter. Rather than permit 
manipulation of constitutional text or the strategically selective 
imposition of history, controlled activism demands that interpreters 
openly acknowledge the Level I normative grounding of their proposed 
interpretive conclusions as a predicate to analysis of ambiguous text. 
When combined, these controls promote judicial humility and, by 
design, prevent the types of furtive, disingenuous, or manipulative 
resort to the superficially objective or political theories of constitutional 
analysis to which originalism and nontextualism have so frequently 
succumbed. 
Legal realists will no doubt summarily dismiss what they will 
consider our naïve effort to restrain constitutional decision making by 
imposition of the requirements of principled analysis. And we readily 
concede that the harsh realities of the judicial review process render 
resort to a rigid notion of geometrical formalism impossible. But the 
realists’ analysis is clumsy and superficial. The mere fact that difficult 
cases will arise does not mean that resort to principle as a measuring rod 
will not substantially impact the legitimacy of judicial review. Indeed, 
we have already demonstrated the unambiguous illegitimacy of 
numerous important Supreme Court decisions. 
Would use of the controlled activism model force the Court to 
change its ways? Perhaps it would not. But the same could no doubt be 
said of any other scholarly critique of the Court’s constitutional decision 
making. However, that concern clearly did not deter scholarly critiques 
in the past, nor should it in the future. At the very least, measuring the 
Court’s constitutional decisions by reference to the controlled activism 
model would provide a coherent set of decision making directives by 
which the Court’s mistakes and encroachments may be exposed. No 
more can be expected of any scholarly theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable disputes will undoubtedly arise over whether a 
particular constitutional decision complies with the terms of the 
controlled activism model. But the same has long been true of 
preexisting scholarly models. In any event, at the very least our model 
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would provide a reasonable and candid aspirational standard against 
which constitutional decision making may be measured. 
The reaction of many observers to the controlled activism 
interpretive model will likely be one of skepticism as to whether courts 
would ever be willing or able to implement the model’s terms. When 
one examines how the Supreme Court has actually approached the task 
of constitutional interpretation over the years, however, it becomes clear 
that in certain instances, at least, the Court’s approach is already closer 
to our model than it is to any of its competitors.
195
 Though aberrations 
no doubt exist, for the most part the Court has not deemed itself bound 
by any form of originalist inquiry, nor has it usually considered itself 
wholly freed from the constraints of text.
196
  
Recognition of the relatively limited (though far from unimportant) 
ways in which traditional Supreme Court adjudication would need to be 
modified to bring it within the formalized framework of our model 
speaks to the ultimate feasibility of moving in this direction. As a 
practical consequence, use of controlled activism would facilitate 
greater transparency and accountability within a system of government 
committed as much to the Constitution as to the promise of democracy. 
Moreover, it would stem unfettered superimposition of political values 
over our highest law by advocates of the originalist and nontextualist 
interpretive models.  
Most importantly, in a true constitutional democracy there exists no 
viable alternative to the controlled activism model. Originalism, to the 
extent it is assumed to be grounded in good faith, places unacceptably 
rigid and artificial restraints on the democratic process. To the extent 
originalism is revealed for what it all too often has been—namely, an 
ideologically driven, strategically manipulative use of cherry-picked 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 349 (1976) (holding that 
individuals have statutorily granted property rights via social security benefits and that 
termination of those benefits implicates due process, but that termination of Social Security 
benefits does not require a pre-termination hearing); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279–83 (1964) (establishing the standard of “actual malice” which must be met before 
press reports about public officials or public figures may be considered defamation and libel); 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 154 (1938) (applying rational-basis 
review to hold that a federal law prohibiting filled milk from being shipped in interstate 
commerce was a legislative judgment). 
 196. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 
(2000). Professor Leonard Levy argued that it is a popular legal fiction that “conservative jurists 
have eschewed judicial activism,” id. at 54, and that the notion of judges as figures who 
historically suppressed “their own policy preferences and impersonally decided as the law told 
them to . . . did not legislate . . . merely discovered and applied the appropriate law to the case at 
hand . . . [and] respected and enforced original intent” is a product of revisionist history. Id. In 
truth, “judicial activism has characterized the Supreme Court from its early history,” id. at 56, 
beginning with the very first constitutional case decided by the Court in 1793, Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
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historical data
197—its harmful impact on the delicate balance inherent in 
constitutional democracy should be obvious. Moreover, the unlimited 
power vested in an unrepresentative, unaccountable judiciary by any 
interpretive model not bound by even the outer reaches of text smacks 
of government by authoritarian philosopher kings—hardly a political 
system consistent with foundational notions of democratic thought. 
In contrast to these failed models, controlled activism seeks to strike 
the delicate balance between the adjective and the noun in the phrase 
“constitutional democracy.” We readily concede that the model is far 
from perfect. But what Winston Churchill said about democracy itself 
may be paraphrased to describe controlled activism: It is the worst 
model of constitutional interpretation—except for all the others.198 
 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See discussion supra Part I. 
 198. Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, Nov. 11, 1947, as quoted in 
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979) (“[I]t has been said that democracy 
is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time.”).  
53
Redish and Arnould: Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democrati
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
